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INTRODUCTION
At the Virginia Military Institute ("VMI"), brutal hazing by older
students and an utter lack of personal privacy greet new students.! In
contrast, at the Young Women's Leadership School, located in East
Harlem, New York, teachers bestow upon their students
"'unconditional love'" and students learn in an elite private school
atmosphere, replete with classical music in the cafeteria and mid-
morning muffins.2 The commonality that links these schools is a sin-
gle-sex student body. Last spring, in the name of ensuring equal pro-
tection for women, the Supreme Court mandated that the elite all-
male VMI abandon its sex-exclusive admission standard and open its
doors and its benefits to women seeking its "unique educational op-
portunities. "3 The fate of the Young Women's Leadership School
remains to be seen.
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I See Dianne Avery, Institutional Myths, Historical Narratives and Social Science Evi-
dence: Reading the "Record" in the Virginia Military Institute Case 5 S. CAL. REV. L. &
WOMEN'S STUD. 189, 325, 348 (1996) (comparing the mental and physical abuse in-
flicted on new VMI cadets as well as the absence of privacy to fraternity hazing).
2 Tamara Henry, A New Push for Girls-Only Public Schools, USA TODAY, Sept. 18,
1996, at 1D, 2D (quoting the principal, Celenia Chevere, on the school's staff ap-
proach).
3 United States v. Virginia (VAX! VI), 116 S. Ct. 2264, 2269 (1996). Women will at-
tend VMI beginning in the fall of 1997. See Bob Twigg, VM_! to Change Little for Women,
USA TODAY, Sept. 23, 1996, at 3A (noting VMI's reaction to the Supreme Court's deci-
sion requiring the school to admit women).
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As the suit against VMI wound its way through the federal courts,4
a movement took root among educators, particularly in the nation's
inner-city school districts.5 These educators, desperate for new solu-
tions to the grave problems facing their schools, turned to, among
other things, the evil the Justice Department fought to abolish: sin-
gle-sex education.6 In Detroit, the school district proposed three
schools exclusively for African-American males which were quickly
challenged and enjoined.7 Elsewhere, cities have tried or are trying
single-sex classrooms.8 The Young Women's Leadership School
('YWLS"), an all-girls junior high school that recently opened, repre-
sents the latest incarnation of the movement.9
4 See United States v. Virginia (VMF 1), 766 F. Supp. 1407 (W.D. Va. 1991), vacated,
976 F.2d 890 (4th Cir. 1992) (VMII), cert. denied, 508 U.S. 946 (1993), on remand, 852
F. Supp. 471 (W.D. Va. 1994) (VM'II7), affd, 44 F.3d 1229 (4th Cir.) (VM!/V), reh'k
denied, 52 F.3d 90 (4th Cir. 1995) (VAM! 10, rev'd, 116 S. Ct. 2264 (1996) (Vf VI).
5 See Walteen Grady Truely & Martha F. Davis, Public Education Programs for African-
American Males: A GenderEquity Perspective 21 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 725, 728-
29 (1994-1995) (noting that the debate has focused on programs for African-American
male students); cf. Stephanie Gutmann, Class Conflict, NEW REPUBuC, Oct. 7, 1996, at
12, 14 ("[S]ex segregation ... is a culturally conservative remedy increasingly popular
with embattled minorities, however objectionable it may be to many white liberals.");
Henry, supra note 2, at ID (discussing the upsurge in interest in single-sex education
nationally which is exemplified by California Governor Pete Wilson's setting aside
funds for 20 such schools and by legislation before Congress to fund pilot programs
and to eliminate Title IX sections that bar single-sex classrooms).
6 See Note, Inner-City Single-Sex Schools: Educational Reform or Invidious Discrimina-
tion, 105 HARV. L. REV. 1741, 1742 (1992) [hereinafter Inner-City Single-Sex Schools]
(noting the efforts of educational reform advocates to establish single-sex schools in
poor school districts); see also Rene Sanchez, In East Harlem, a School Without Boys,
WASH. POST, Sept. 22, 1996, at Al ("[S]chools nationwide ... [are] reconsider[ing]
the one-size-fits-all, fully integrated model of public schooling and experiment[ing]
with same-sex classes, either for disadvantaged minorities or for girls in subjects such
as math or science that traditionally have been dominated by males."); George F. Will,
Secret of School Success, WASH. POST, Sept. 15, 1996, at C7 (advocating innovative piece-
meal programs, like the Young Women's Leadership School, to solve the educational
crisis in spite of equal protection issues).
7 See Pamela J. Smith, Comment, All-Male Black Schools and the Equal Protection
Clause: A Step Forward Toward Education, 66 TUL. L. REV. 2003, 2006 & n.8 (1992); In-
ner-City Single-Sex Schools, supra note 6, at 1742 (noting a proposal to establish three all-
male schools in Detroit in order to help "at risk" boys).
8 See HERBERT GROSSMAN & SUZANNE H. GROSSMAN, GENDER ISSUES IN EDUCATION
147 (1994) (stating that several private organizations and school districts have begun
single-sex educational programs).
Recently, all-female schools have enjoyed increased popularity. See Pamela War-
rick, A Place Where Girls Can BeAll That They Can Be LA TIMES, Dec. 1, 1996, at El; cf.
Liz Willen, Girls' School Gets Lesson in Controversy: Some Call It Discrimination, NEWSDAY
(Long Island), Nov. 6, 1996, at A68 (noting that YWLS marks the third all-girls public
secondary school nationwide). The other two single-sex public schools, Girls High in
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This Comment examines the constitutionality of YWLS under the
Fourteenth Amendment. Part I of the Comment relays the facts and
circumstances surrounding YWLS. An overview of the important case
law follows in Part II, which places special emphasis on the two most
important cases pertaining to single-sex education: Mississippi Univer-
sity for Women v. Hogan'0 and United States v. Virginia ("VMI")." Part III
applies the analyses gleaned from Hogan and VM! to YWLS. First, the
applicable level of scrutiny is determined and explained. Second,
two purposes that the school district might offer-diversity and im-
proving education-are reviewed and critiqued. These two justifica-
tions, when subjected to intermediate scrutiny, do not rise to the level
of an "exceedingly persuasive justification."5 The discussion of the di-
versity objective reveals that the only type of diversity the Court might
accept is akin to a "separate but equal" single-sex school system. Al-
though the Court has neither accepted nor rejected this doctrine in
the area of sex classifications, 14 this Comment concludes that even if
the Supreme Court were to permit such a system in the sex-
classification context, other aspects of the Court's reasoning would
constrain the doctrine's effect.
Finally, Part IV analyzes another possible justification that the
school district might offer-compensation-which should satisfy the
test. Courts have accepted genuinely compensatory purposes so long
as the means work directly to achieve the remedial objective.'5 Here,
a single-sex school with a heavily math-, science-, and leadership-
Philadelphia and Western in Baltimore, have survived by maintaining low profiles and
technically being open to both girls and boys (though few boys have expressed interest
in applying). See Mary B.W. Tabor, Planners of a New Public School for Girls Look to Two
Other Cities, N.Y. TIMEffS,July 22, 1996, at BI.
458 U.S. 718 (1982).
"116 S. Ct. 2264 (1996). These cases are most important because they represent
the only modem cases decided in this area which provide the benefit of the Supreme
Court's actual reasoning.
12 In sex discrimination cases, courts utilize intermediate level scrutiny which re-
quires that "the classification serves 'important governmental objectives and that the
discriminatory means employed' are 'substantially related to the achievement of those
objectives.'" Hogan, 458 U.S. at 724 (quoting Wengler v. Druggists Mutual Ins. Co., 446
U.S. 142, 150 (1980)).
13 VM! V, 116 S. Ct. at 2274.
14 See Lisa K. Hsiao, 'Separate but Equal' Revisited: The Detroit Male Academies Case,
1992/1993 ANN. SURV. A.M. L. 85, 92 (noting that the "Court has never extended
[Broun's] holding to gender-based classifications").
is See, e.g., Califano v. Webster, 430 U.S. 313, 318 (1977) (per curiam) (upholding
a statutory scheme designed to increase Social Security retirement benefits for
women).
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centered curriculum is tailored to increase the numbers of women in
professions requiring a math and science background and in leader-
ship positions in general. Although compensatory rationales carry
the danger of entrenching harmful gender stereotypes, YWLS aims to
shatter traditional gender rules, and thus should avoid this pitfall.
I. THE BRIEF HISTORY OF THEYOUNG WOMEN'S LEADERSHIP SCHOOL
In the fall of 1996, the doors of the Young Women's Leadership
School ("YWLS"), located in District Four, in East Harlem, New
York,6 opened for fifty-five seventh-grade girls." Next year the school
will also house grades eight and nine, and it plans to expand through
grade twelve within several years. The idea for the school originated
with Ann Rubenstein Tisch,' a wealthy woman who wanted to give
poor girls an educational opportunity usually reserved for the rich-a
single-sex education. 9 Ms. Tisch noted that the best schools in Eng-
land are single-sex."° The school emphasizes math and science,2' dis-
16 Previously, New York City had many other singe-sex schools, but the civil rights
movement led to the end of that era. The last girls school, Washington Irving High
School, closed in 1986 due to apprehension that it violated federal anti-segregation
laws. SeeAnemona Hartocollis, A Public Schoolfor Girls Only, DAILY NEWS (N.Y.),July 15,
1996, at 4.
17The innovative school limits class size to no more than 18 students. SeeJacques
Steinberg,Just Girls, and That's Fine with Them, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 1, 1997, at 21. Instead
of desks, the girls sit around small tables "because research shows that girls prefer to
learn by cooperating-not competing-with each other." Sanchez, supra note 6, at
Al. This type of evidence about supposed sex differences did not get much deference
from the Supreme Court in VMI. See VA V, 116 S. Ct. at 2280 (1996) ("[W]e have
cautioned reviewing courts to take a 'hard look' at generalizations or 'tendencies' of
the kind pressed by Virginia.. ").
18 Despite Ms. Tisch's involvement in the school's planning, YWLS is not a private
school, but a public school "funded just like any other public school." Henry, supra
note 2, at 1D.
19 See Anemona Hartocollis, Groups: Get All-Girls School Off A-Gender, DAILY NEWS
(N.Y.), July 16, 1996, at 14 ("'If single-sex schools are so good for affluent students,
wouldn't it follow that they would be good for poor children?'" (quoting Ann Ruben-
stein Tisch, the philanthropist who helped launch YWLS)). Similar to the private
schools that wealthy girls often attend, this school projects a "finishing-school image."
Henry, supra note 2, at ID (describing "midmorning muffins; club-like furnishings;
classical music in the cafeteria"). The girls also wear uniforms. See id.
20 SeeHartocollis, supra note 19, at 14.
21 See Sanchez, supra note 6, at Al (noting studies which show that teachers in
many public schools discourage girls from pursuing interests in math or science); see
also Hartocollis, supra note 16, at 4 ("[I]t is designed to create an environment where
high-achieving girls from disadvantaged backgrounds can be encouraged to excel in
science and math, and where they can move from poverty to the boardroom and aca-
demia.").
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ciplines in which girls have historically underperformed.2 Ms. Tisch
and the school district expect the girls to perform better at these dis-
ciplines and in general without boys in the classroom. School offi-
cials also argue that the school is designed to combat the discrimina-
tion to which co-ed schools subject female students.21
The school encountered no difficulties in attracting applicants to
fill its limited spaces,2 and in fact, it already has a wait list.21 The
main difficulty the school has faced is opposition by groups such as
the New York Civil Liberties Union ("NYCLU"), the New York Civil
Rights Coalition, and the NewYork chapter of the National Organiza-
2 See NATIONAL CTR. FOR EDUC. STATISTICS, THE EDUCATIONAL PROGRESS OF
WOMEN 3-4 (1995) (reporting that inferior science performance by girls first appears
around age nine and lasts through age seventeen). But see GROSSMAN & GROSSMAN,
supra note 8, at 29-30 (arguing that studies show that the gap between boys and girls in
math has decreased).
See ANNMARIE WOLPE, WITHIN SCHOOL WALLS 212 (1988) (reporting that co-ed
math and science classes have been cited as a major factor in girls' underachievement
in math and science); see also Hartocollis, supra note 19, at 14 (citing statistics showing
that girls do better in science and math when they are apart from boys). At least one
teacher at the school has reported a palpable difference in the behavior of her stu-
dents: "'With the boys around, you have girls that giggle and talk because they are
afraid of the boys or trying to get their attention .... I find there is a certain amount
of tension not present when you have only girls.'" Willen, supra note 9, at A68
(quoting a YWLS teacher, Linda Metnetsky); cf. Gutmann, supra note 5, at 12
("[P]articularly at their age group, with puberty, you're really conscious about your
body and it's good to be in an environment where you don't feel extra self-conscious
because you have boys around." (quoting Winsome McDermott, a mother pushing to
get her daughter on YWLS wait list)). But see id. ("The idea that girls and boys inevita-
bly distract each other is ... an 'enormously dangerous' presumption ... " (quoting
Janet Gallagher, director of the Women's Rights Project of the ACLU)). Several books
have been published recently, recounting the problems, including eating disorders
and self-esteem problems, that teenage girls experience now more than ever. See, e.g.,
PEGGY ORENSTEIN, SCHOOLGIRLS at xxviii (1994) ("Girls' diminished sense of self
means that, often unconsciously, they take on a second class accommodating status.");
MARY PIPHER, REVIVING OPHELIA 11 (1994) (noting common problems of adolescent
girls such as anorexia, underachievement, and moodiness).
24 See Sheryl McCarthy, Let This All-Girls School Be All Girls, NEWSDAY (Long Island),
July 18, 1996, at A44 ("We're fighting against the discrimination [the girls] face in a
co-ed environment." (quoting Celenia Chevere, principal of YWLS)).
Most YWLS students come from the surrounding neighborhood. See Jacques
Steinberg, Central Board Backs All-Girls Schoo N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 22, 1996, at B3. The
school requires applicants to submit recommendations and transcripts, undergo
preadmission tests, and interview with the school. See Gutmann, supra note 5, at 12.
The school's admission process favors high-achieving students from low income fami-
lies. See Henry, supra note 2, at 2D.
26 See Sanchez, supra note 6, at Al ("[A]lready, [YWLS] has scores of girls on its
waiting list.").
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tion for Women ("NOW") .2 These groups argue that the discrimina-
tory admissions policy violates the Equal Protection Clause as well as a
myriad of federal and state laws.28 They filed a complaint with the
New York Office for Civil Rights of the United States Department of
Education requesting that the public school begin to recruit and ac-
cept boys and perhaps adopt a new gender-neutral name.2
School administrators have not acquiesced to these demands. Al-
though the school accepts applications from boys, it has postponed
making a decision on whether boys may be students at YWLS in fu-
ture years.3s The school district believes, however, that by offering
27 See All-Girls School Can Teach a Lesson, DAILY NEWS (N.Y.), Aug. 15, 1996, at 48
("Supposed champions of the rights-deprived underdogs, the[se groups] are using this
issue to attempt to deny certain New York children the right to educational opportu-
nity.... They see this school as the greatest threat to liberty since George III."). The
school has attracted a lot of attention from groups and people of all political persua-
sions. SeeJohn Leo, Boys on the Side, U.S. NEWs & WORLD REP., Aug. 5, 1996, at 18
("[T]here has been a lot of scrambling to determine which side is more politically cor-
rect, and there has been a lot of left-right crossover.").
28 See, e.g., Henry, supra note 2, at 1D ("The groups point to violations of the 14th
Amendment, the 1964 Civil Rights Act, and Title IX."); McCarthy, supra note 24, at
A44 (noting that the New York Civil Liberties Union has complained that the school's
policy is unconstitutional because it only admits girls). Although YWLS can be chal-
lenged on several legal fronts in addition to the Fourteenth Amendment, the statutes
implicated are beyond the scope of this Comment, which deals exclusively with the
school's constitutionality under the Equal Protection Clause.
See Michael Meyers, Schools Dodge the Law, USA TODAY, Oct. 15, 1996, at 14A
(arguing that YWLS should be "knocked out" like "Detroit's discriminatory all-male
public schools"). Recently, the civil rights groups have alleged that the district and
school board are deliberately dragging their feet in supplying documents to the De-
partment of Education for its investigation. See Rose Kim, Data Ready in Bias Case,
NEWSDAY (Queens), Feb. 4, 1997, at A22. The NYCLU, the New York chapter of NOW
and the New York Civil Rights Coalition will file a court challenge if they can attract a
male plaintiff. See Gutmann, supra note 5, at 12.
In addition to the statutory and constitutional arguments these groups make in
opposition to the school, they also make policy arguments. See, e.g., Meyers, supra, at
14A ("In an otherwise coed world, sexist schools will teach girls that they can reach for
the stars, but only in a universe without boys."); Sanchez, supra note 6, at Al (noting
that charges against the school include that it fosters negative stereotypes of each sex
and that it misdirects educational reform efforts away from the real problems plaguing
schools).
so See, e.g., Jacques Steinberg, All-Girls Public School to Open Despite Objections, N.Y.
TIMES, Aug. 14, 1996, at B1 [hereinafter Steinberg, All-Girls Public School to Open] ("[I)f
a boy did apply.., they are not sure whether they would accept him, considering that
the interview process is geared toward finding girls interested in learning to be lead-
ers.");Jacques Steinberg, Central Board Backs All-Girls School N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 22, 1996,
at B3 [hereinafter Steinberg, Central Board Backs School] (noting that the school district
and board of education have "reserved" a decision on whether to admit boys in the
future).
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comparable mathematics, science and leadership curricula at other
district schools, the school will be able to withstand constitutional
scrutiny.3 Most recently, District Four has announced that it is ex-
ploring the idea of creating an all-boys school comparable to YWLS,
inspired at least in part to ward off litigation aimed at YWLS. 2
II. CASE LAW PERTAINING TO SINGLE-SEX SCHOOLS
This Part touches upon some of the early cases regarding single-
sex education, decided under the rational basis test.3 In Craig v.
Boren, the Supreme Court formulated the intermediate scrutiny stan-
dard after it explicitly rejected rational basis review in Frontiero v.
Richardson.5 Cases decided under the intermediate scrutiny test,sm in-
31 See Steinberg, Central Board Backs Schooi supra note 30, at B3.
52 See Lawrence Goodman & Anne E. Kornblut, New School Agender: Bays' HS, DAILY
NEWS (N.Y.), Dec. 11, 1996, at 2 (stating that an all-boys school may appease current
challengers ofYWLS).
33 The rational basis test requires that the state's discriminatory classification have
"a basis in reason." Goesaert v. Cleary, 335 U.S. 464, 467 (1948) (upholding law which
denied bartending licenses to women unless they were the wives or daughters of male
bar owners). For other cases regarding single-sex education decided before Craig v.
Boren, 429 U.S. 190 (1976), see Kirstein v. Rector, 309 F. Supp. 184 (E.D. Va. 1970)
(ordering that Virginia admit women to the University of Virginia); Allred v. Heaton,
336 S.W.2d 251 (Tex. Civ. App. 1960) (refusing a woman entrance to the Texas A & M
University even though she desired to major in a subject matter that was only offered
at that school); Heaton v. Bristol, 317 S.W.2d 86 (Tex. Civ. App. 1958) (denying
women entrance to the Texas A & M University because of the availability of compara-
ble schools).
See 429 U.S. 190 (1976). In Craig, an Oklahoma statute prohibiting the sale of
3.2% beer to males under 21 but only prohibiting the sale of this type of beverage to
females under 18 was challenged as a denial of equal protection to males aged 18-20.
See id. at 191-92 (stating the issue of the case as "whether such a gender-based differen-
tial constitutes a denial to males 18-20 years of age of the equal protection of the laws
in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment"). The Supreme Court found that the sta-
tistics proffered by the state to justify the law were "too tenuous to satisfy Reed's re-
quirement that the gender-based difference be substantially related to [the goal of
Oklahoma's statutory scheme]" and held that the law therefore denied men between
the ages 18-20 equal protection. Id. at 204.
411 U.S. 677 (1973). A plurality in Frontiero actually applied strict scrutiny. See
id. at 688 (arguing the unconstitutionality of a statute which provided female members
of the uniformed services with allowances for dependents, but under certain restric-
tions, when male members were not similarly restricted).
36 In order to pass intermediate scrutiny, "'classifications by gender must serve im-
portant governmental objectives and must be substantially related to achievement of
those objectives.'" Califano v. Webster, 430 U.S. 313, 316-17 (1977) (quoting Craig;
429 U.S. at 197); see infra Part IV.A.
1997]
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cluding Hogan 7 and VMf s8 are looked at in greater depth.
A. Pre-Craig CaseLaw
1. Williams v. McNair
In Williams v. McNair," decided in 1971, the Supreme Court af-
firmed by memorandum a South Carolina district court's refusal to
order admission of men to the all-women Winthrop College. The dis-
trict court noted that the State maintained a wide array of school of-
ferings and that, with the exception of Winthrop and the Citadel,
South Carolina's other public universities admitted both sexes.4' The
court explained that historically, the legislature adjudged the Citadel,
a military school, more appropriate for men 4' and Winthrop, which
offered courses in "needlework, cooking, housekeeping and such
other industrial arts" more appropriate for women.42 Applying ra-
tional basis review,43 the court found the discrimination not "wholly
wanting in reason" because of the long tradition and history of single-
sex education, even though the methodology was not in favor at the
moment." The court distinguished Kirstein v. Rector and Visitors of the
University of Virginia,45 in which a court mandated the admission of
women to the University of Virginia, on the basis that in Kirstein, the
female plaintiff had been denied admission to Virginia's finest state
school, whereas Winthrop College did not occupy such a position. 6
37 458 U.S. 718 (1982).
18 16S. Ct. 2264 (1996).
39 401 U.S. 951 (1971) (mem.), aft'g316 F. Supp. 134 (D.S.C. 1970).
40 See Williams, 316 F. Supp. at 135-36.
41 The Citadel was ordered to admit women in 1995. See Faulkner v.Jones, 51 F.3d
440, 450 (4th Cir. 1995) (holding that the Citadel's offering single-sex education to
males withoutjustification violates the Equal Protection Clause).
42 Williams, 316 F. Supp. at 136 n.3; cf. MARIA MOBILIA BOUMIL ET AL-, LAW AND
GENDER BIAS 171-72 (1994) ("By the beginning of the twentieth century, a significant
number of women were able to acquire some form of higher education. The form this
'higher education' took, however, was still based upon what was considered suitable
and helpful for young women to learn, and the curricula of many women's schools
were limited accordingly.").
43 See Williams, 316 F. Supp. at 136-37 ("It is only when the discriminatory treat-
ment and varying standards, as created by the legislative or administrative classification
are arbitrary and wanting in any rational justification that they offend the Equal Pro-
tection Clause." (footnote omitted)).
44 See id. at 137.
309 F. Supp. 184 (E.D. Va. 1970).
See Williams, 316 F. Supp at 138-39 ("It is not intimated that Winthrop offers a
wider range of subject matter or enjoys a position of outstanding prestige over the
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Citing Heaton v. Bristol,47 the court rejected the argument that the
school's convenient location to some or all of the plaintiffs' homes
constitutionally demanded their admittance to the school.48 The
court also rebuffed the plaintiffs' argument that Winthrop's allow-
ance of men in its summer and evening classes weakened the State's
legislative judgment that an all-women state school has merit 49 Refus-
ing to question such legislative determinations, the court stated,
"flexibility and diversity in educational methods, when not tainted
with racial overtones, often are both desirable and beneficial; they
should be encouraged, not condemned."0
2. Vorchheimer v. School District
Later that decade, in Vorchheimer v. School District,5 ' an evenly di-
vided Supreme Court affirmed in a memorandum opinion the Third
Circuit's refusal to admit women to Philadelphia's prestigious all-boys
Central High School. The plaintiff, Susan Vorchheimer, an academi-
cally gifted student, had visited several Philadelphia high schools, in-
cluding Girls High, the all-girls counterpart to Central, and preferred
the atmosphere and academic excellence of Central . The trial
court, however, found Girls High "academically and functionally
equivalent" to Central.53 Based on this finding, the Third Circuit
characterized Vorchheimer's reason for wanting to attend Central as
"based on personal preference rather than being founded on an ob-, • 54
jective evaluation" of the school's offenngs. The Third Circuit's rea-
soning, however, was flawed by its own admission that Central's sci-
ence facilities were superior to those of Girls High. 5
other State-supported institutions in this state whose admission policies are co-
educational.").
47 317 S.W.2d 86,99 (Tex. Civ. App. 1958).
SSee Williams, 316 F. Supp. at 138 (recognizing that the location of any institution
necessarily benefits some and is a detriment to others, which does notjustify preferen-
tial treatment for those who wish to attend an educational institution in their home
town).
49 See id. (concluding that it is for the legislature, not the courts, to decide whether
Winthrop's merit as an all-women institution was weakened).30 Id.
430 U.S. 703 (1977), affg532 F.2d 880 (3d Cir. 1976).
52 See Vorchheimer, 532 F.2d at 882.
33 Id. (citing Vorchheimer v. School Dist., 400 F. Supp. 326, 329 (E.D. Pa. 1975)).
Despite this finding, the district court, using heightened scrutiny, ordered an injunc-
tion to force the school to admit girls. See Vorchheimer, 400 F. Supp. at 343.
54 Vorchhdmer, 532 F.2d at 882.
See id. ("The academic facilities are comparable, with the exception of those in
1997]
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Although the Supreme Court employed noticeably heightened
rational basis review in Reed v. Reed, ' the Court in Vorchheimer distin-
guished Reed and found William.w7 controlling.58  In distinguishing
Reed and other recent sex discrimination cases in which the Supreme
Court had struck down discriminatory statutes,59 the Vorchheimer Court
stated that unlike in the instant case, "[n]one of the cases was con-
cerned with a situation in which equal opportunity was extended to
each sex or in which the restriction applied to both."'O The Court
also denied that Sweatt v. Painte' and Brown v. Board of Education2
applied because sex, unlike race, is not a suspect classification.
a
Judge Gibbons, in his dissent, compared the majority's opinion to
Plessy v. Ferguson," arguing that it "reminds us that the [separate but
equal] doctrine can and will be invoked to support sexual discrimina-
tion in the same manner that it supported racial discrimination prior
to Brown."65 He also remarked that Vorchheimer should not have to
submit to segregation to receive the best schooling Philadelphia of-
the scientific field where Central's are superior.").
404 U.S. 71, 76 (1971) (requiring a "'fair and substantial relation'" between the
ends and the means (quoting Royster Guano Co. v. Virginia, 253 U.S. 412, 415
(1920))).
57 316 F. Supp. at 134.
See Vorchheimer, 532 F.2d at 887 ("We may not cavalierly disregard Williams al-
though it predated Reed by a few months. Indeed, the two cases are not inconsistent
because the state schools' restrictive admissions policy applied to both sexes, a signifi-
cant difference from the preferential statutory procedure in Reed. This distinction is
enough to justify the use of the rational relationship test in Willams.. .. " (footnote
omitted)).
59 See, e.g., Stanton v. Stanton, 421 U.S. 7, 14 (1975) (rejecting a state statute that,
in the context of parental support obligations, specified a greater age of majority for
males than for females); Weinberger v. Wiesenfeld, 420 U.S. 636, 653 (1975)
(rejecting a policy that paid Social Security benefits to the minor children of both
male and female wage-earners, but only to the surviving spouse of male, not female,
wage-earners); Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 690 (1973) (rejecting an Air
Force policy that provided allowances for dependent spouses of servicemen without
restriction, but for dependent spouses of servicewomen only if it could be proved that
the Youses were actually dependent).
Vorchheimer, 532 F.2d at 886.
61 339 U.S. 629 (1950).
62 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
63 See Vorchheimer, 532 F.2d at 886 ("We are committed to the concept that there is
no fundamental difference between races and therefore, in justice, there can be no
dissimilar treatment. But there are differences between the sexes which may, in lim-
ited circumstances,justify disparity in law.").
163 U.S. 537 (1896):
Vorchheimer, 532 F.2d at 889 (Gibbons,J, dissenting).
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fered to girls."" Seven years later, a state court, applying intermediate
scrutiny, ordered Central to admit girls.67
B. Post-Craig Case Law
1. Mississippi University for Women v. Hogan
The main precedent relied on by the Supreme Court in VM! was
Mississippi University for Women v. Hogan.0 In Hogan, Joe Hogan, a reg-
istered nurse in the city where the Mississippi University for Women
School of Nursing ("MUW") was located, sought admission to the
school to obtain his baccalaureate degree in nursing. Although
school officials allowed him and other men to audit the school's
classes, Hogan, an otherwise qualified candidate, could not take
classes for credit at the school "solely because of his sex."69 The Su-
preme Court declared that the discriminatory policy at MUW's nurs-
ing school violated the Equal Protection Clause.70 Although the State
proffered a benign purpose for the classification, and the burden on
the plaintiff could be termed nothing more than the denial of the
convenience of attending a nursing school in his home town, the
Court applied an intermediate level of scrutiny.7' The State argued
that an all-women nursing school served a compensatory purpose-a
remedy for past discrimination against women. The Court rejected
that such compensation actually motivated the State, both because no
affirmative action was needed in the nursing profession, where
women vastly outnumbered men, and because the State made no
See id. (Gibbons, J., dissenting) ("The train Vorchheimer wants to ride is that of
a rigorous academic program among her intellectual peers .... Her choice, like
Plessy's, is to submit to that segregation or refrain from availing herself of the serv-
ice.").
67 See Newberg v. Board of Pub. Educ., 9 Phila. County Rep. 556, 577 (C.P. Phila.
County 1983) ("Said defendants ... are enjoined from barring admission of students
to Central High School based solely upon gender.").
68 458 U.S. 718 (1982). Interestingly, some of the salient facts of this case, includ-
ing the plaintiff's desire to attend a conveniently located school and the fact that the
university at issue had an imperfect single-sex policy, recall Williams. The Hogan
court's reliance on these factors differed considerably from that of the Williams court.
69 Id. at 720-21.
70 See id. at 733.
71 See id. at 724 n.9 ("[W]hen a classification expressly discriminates on the basis of
gender, the analysis and level of scrutiny applied to determine the validity of the classi-
fication do not vary simply because the objective appears acceptable to individual
Members of the Court.").
72 See id. at 727.
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showing that such a purpose motivated the legislature.7 Also, the
Court reasoned that single-sex education could not substantially re-
late to any important state purpose because the University allowed
men to audit the classes.74 Thus, Mississippi's proposed interests and
the tie between the State's interests and its means "fall[] far short of
establishing the 'exceedingly persuasive justification' needed to sus-
tain the gender-based classification." 75
In one of three separate dissents in the case, Justice Powell argued
that the school served the important state purpose of having a diverse
school system, one including all-women's schools that have been the
preference of "more than 40,000 young women.., over the years."76
He denigrated the use of an intermediate level of scrutiny because
the plaintiffs burden was only an inconvenience that was "somewhat
embarrassed by the fact that there is, of course, no constitutional
right to attend a state-supported university in one's home town."7
Justice Blackmun's dissent also bemoaned the use of the Equal Pro-
tection Clause to destroy long-cherished societal fixtures such as sin-
gle-sex schooling. 78
Chief Justice Burger's dissent emphasized that the Court's hold-
ing was limited to a professional nursing school." He believed that
the Court's emphasis on the fact that no affirmative action was neces-
sary in the nursing profession "suggests that a State might well be jus-
tified in maintaining, for example, the option of an all-women's busi-
73 See id. at 729-30 ("Mississippi has made no showing that women lacked opportu-
nities to obtain training in the field of nursing or to attain positions of leadership in
that field when the MUW School of Nursing opened its door or that women currently
are deprived of such opportunities.").
74 See id. at 730 ("MUW's policy of permitting men to attend classes as auditors fa-
tally undermines its claim that women, at least those in the School of Nursing, are ad-
versely affected by the presence of men.").
7675Id. at 731.
76 Id. at 735 (Powell, J., dissenting) ("Left without honor-indeed, held unconsti-
tutional-is an element of diversity that has characterized much of American educa-
tion and enriched much of American life.").
77 Id. at 736 (Powell,J., dissenting).
78 See id. at 734 (Blackmun,J., dissenting) ("[flt is easy to go too far with rigid rules
in this area of claimed sex discrimination, and to lose-indeed destroy-values that
mean much to some people by forbidding the State to offer them a choice while not
depriving others of an alternative choice.").
79 See id. at 733 (Burger, C.J., dissenting); see also id. at 723 n.7 ("[W]e decline to
address the question of whether MUW's admissions policy, as applied to males seeking
admission to schools other than the School of Nursing, violates the Fourteenth
Amendment.").
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ness school or liberal arts program.""
2. Garrett v. Board of Education
Between the Hogan and VMI decisions, a district court in Detroit
in Garrett v. Board of Education8' enjoined the opening of three pro-
posed all-male schools ("Academies").82 Plaintiffs, parents and their
female children attending public school in Detroit, objected to the
Detroit Board of Education's decision to restrict the enrollment of
the Academies to boys. The Board decided to create the schools in
response to the crisis facing the city's African-American males,0 and
the Academies' programs were designed to alleviate the major prob-
lems this group faced.8 Plaintiffs argued that the programs did not
require the absence of girls to succeed and that the programs, in fact,
contained information relevant to boys and girls alike.8 The plain-
tiffs also argued that despite the Board's volunteered aim to address
problems like excessive unemployment, school dropout rates, and
violence plaguing urban males, enrollment at the Academies was not
limited to boys likely to suffer such problems, but rather, the admis-
sions policy required that high, mid-level and low-need boy students
attend the school in equal numbers. 5 Moreover, plaintiffs asserted,
restricting admission to boys "ignor[es] the plight of urban females
[which] institutionalizes inequality and perpetuates the myth that
80 Id. at 733 (Burger, CJ., dissenting).
81 775 F. Supp. 1004 (E.D. Mich. 1991).
See id. at 1006 (observing that the Academies planned to serve around 250 boys
from preschool to fifth grade, with sixth grade through eighth grades added in the
near future).
See id. at 1007 (acknowledging that African-American males faced high homi-
cide, unemployment and school drop-out rates); see also Daniel E. Gardenswartz,
Comment, Public Education: An Inner-City Crisis! Single-Sex Schools: An Inner-City An-
swer?, 42 EMORYLJ. 591, 609-11 (1993) (stating that, at the time of the Board of Educa-
tion action, in Wayne County, Michigan, "the number of young, minority men in the
criminal justice system was greater than all minority men of all ages then enrolled in
collVge").
See Garrett, 775 F. Supp. at 1006 (noting that the Academies' offerings include "a
class entitled 'Rites of Passage,' an Afrocentric (Pluralistic) curriculum, futuristic les-
sons in preparation for 21st century careers, an emphasis on male responsibility, men-
tors, Saturday classes, individualized counseling, extended classroom hours, and stu-
dent uniforms").
5 See id.
See id. at 1006 n.3 (explaining that the admissions process required the separa-
tion of applicants into categories of high, mid-level and low need, and one-third of
admitted students were randomly selected from each).
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females are doing well in the current system."
8 7
Like Mississippi in Hogan, Detroit argued that the Academies
served a compensatory purpose." Detroit distinguished itself from
Mississippi by arguing that the group benefiting from its classification,
urban males, performs substantially worse than urban females in De-
troit's co-ed learning environments.89 Although the court accepted
that the current educational system failed its male students, the court
noted that Detroit made no showing that the presence of girls in its
schools caused the failure. 90 The court was disturbed by the prospect
that if the male Academies succeeded, "success would be equated with
the absence of girls rather than any of the educational factors that
more probably caused the outcome."9' Thus, even though Detroit
had an "important" purpose in wanting to remedy the problems fac-
ing urban males, the city still had to provide evidence that the exclu-
sion of females was necessary to fight these problems. The court
noted that this need would be difficult to show, given that "the educa-
tional system is also failing females."92 In sum, the important gov-
ernmental interest alone "is insufficient to override the rights of fe-
males to equal opportunities. ""s
3. United States v. Virginia
The last and most important precedent discussed here is United
States v. Virginia, (VMI).94 In VMT, the Court, in an opinion written by
87 Id. at 1007; see also Truely & Davis, supra note 5 (challenging the idea that only
African-American boys are at-risk and discussing some of the problems and needs of
African-American girls).
88 See Garret 775 F. Supp. at 1007 (noting that in Hogan, Mississippi justified its
policy on grounds that it compensated women for historical discrimination,just as the
Academies served to compensate urban males for the failure of coeducational pro-
grams).
89 See id. ("[D]efendant here argues it has confirmed that the present delivery of
education has resulted in substantially lower achievement levels for males than for fe-
males ... ."). But cf. Hsiao, supra note 14, at 109 (noting that "the perception that Af-
rican American females are far outperforming African American males educationally
and socially not only ignores the equally pressing problems faced by females, but also
may prove stigmatizing and demoralizing for males, who are already disproportion-
ately represented in programs addressing special education and disciplinary prob-
lems").
90 See Garrett, 775 F. Supp. at 1007 ("Although co-educational programs have failed,
there is no showing that it is the co-educational factor that results in failure.").
91 Id.
92 Id. at 1008.
9s Id. at 1014.
94 116 S. Ct. 2264 (1996).
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Justice Ginsburg,95 mandated that the all-male Virginia Military Insti-
tute (VMI) admit women as cadets. The VMI is a prestigious, state-
run institution of higher learning that has a long tradition of produc-
ing leaders and others in esteemed societal positions.96 The school
uses a unique form of training designed to produce "citizen-
soldiers." 7  No comparable educational opportunity existed for
women in the Commonwealth of Virginia.98
In 1990, on behalf of an anonymous woman who desired to at-
tend VMI, the Justice Department brought suit against Virginia and
VMI.'" Initially, the district court ruled that the school passed legal
muster, despite finding that some women desired entrance to VMI' °°
and that some women would be able to perform all that the school
required of its cadets.'0 ' The court also found, however, that if
women were allowed access to this unique opportunity, some of the
school's unique qualities would have to be altered.0 2 In sum, because
the adversative environment could not survive unaltered, the court
found "sufficient constitutional justification" for maintaining VMI as
an all-male institution.'03 The district court reasoned tautologically
95 For a fascinating discussion of Ruth Bader Ginsburg's pivotal role as a practicing
lawyer in gender jurisprudence, see Collin O'Connor Udell, Note, Signaling a New Di-
rection in Gender Classification Scrutiny: United States v. Virginia, 29 CONN. L. REv. 521,
524-28 (1996).
96 See VM/V/, 116 S. Ct. at 2269 (noting that graduates of VMI have gone on to be-
come "military generals, Members of Congress, and business executives").
97 See id. ("VMI uses an 'adversative method' modeled on English public schools
and once characteristic of military instruction.").
98 See id. (observing that VMI is the sole educational institution in Virginia that
utilizes the adversative method). The Court noted, however, that the course offerings
available at VMI were available elsewhere in Virginia. See id. at 2270 (explaining the
difference between VMI and other state universities is that "VMI's mission is special").
99 See id. at 2271 (stating that the United States sued Virginia and VMI on the
grounds that VMI's exclusive male admission policy violated the Equal Protection
Clause).
100 "Between 1988 and 1990, VMI received inquiries, test scores, or other requests
for information from 347 women.... VMI did not respond to them .... " See VAI I,
766 F. Supp. 1407, 1436 (W.D. Va. 1991).
101 See VM, 766 F. Supp. at 1412. But see Faulkner v. Jones, 858 F. Supp. 552, 569
(D.S.C. 1994) (holding that the Citadel's discriminatory admissions policy violates the
Equal Protection Clause and ordering the admission of plaintiff Shannon Faulkner).
For an in-depth analysis of the Faulkner litigation, see Sara L. Mandelbaum, A Judicial
Blow for Jane Crowism" at The Citadel in Faulkner v. Jones, 15 N. ILL U. L. REv. 3
(1994).
102 See V/ATI, 766 F. Supp. at 1412-13 (describing the inevitable changes to the ad-
versative environment, such as the loss of all-male status, allowances for personal pri-
vacy, and the alteration of physical education requirements).
1O3 Id.
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from the premises that VMI's uniqueness added to the diversity of
Virginia's educational system and that single-sex education benefited
both sexes to conclude that the only way to accomplish the important
governmental objective of single-sex education "is to exclude women
from the all-male institution-VMI."1
0 4
The Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals, however, reversed the dis-
trict court's judgment, concluding that "[a] policy of diversity which
aims to provide an array of educational opportunities, including sin-
gle-gender institutions, must do more than favor one gender.""'5 The
court remanded the case in order to find a remedy for the State's
constitutional violation.0 6 The court delineated three possible op-
tions from which Virginia could choose: VMI could admit women, set
up a parallel program or institution, or become a private institution
(thereby abandoning state funding) .107
From these options, the State chose to establish a parallel pro-
gram for women which it called Virginia Women's Institute for Lead-
ership (VWIL) . In designing, the school, the State's Task Force
aimed to fulfill the same mission that VMI strove toward (producing
citizen-soldiers) in a manner suitable for "most women."'O' As a re-
sult, the Task Force decided to eschew the military model, which it
found "wholly inappropriate" for VWIL, and institute a "cooperative
method which reinforces self-esteem.""0 Despite the remarkable dif-
ferences in the financial resources, quality of professors, theories of
education, prestige levels, and course offerings,"' both the district
court and the court of appeals found that VWIL adequately resolved
any equal protection issues raised by the State's maintenance of the
all-male VMI."2 The court of appeals, in scrutinizing the classifica-
104 Id. at 1415.
105 VMI H, 976 F.2d 890, 899 (4th Cir. 1992).
106 See id. at 900 ("[W]e ... remand the case ... to require the defendants to for-
mulate, adopt, and implement a plan that conforms with the Equal Protection Clause
107 See id., 976 F.2d at 900.
108 See VMI III, 852 F. Supp. 471, 476-477 (W.D. Va. 1994) (examining whether
VWIL, as a remedial plan, comports with the Equal Protection Clause).
1o9 Id. at 476.
110 Id.
I See id. at 477 (describing the differences between VMI and VWIL).
112 See VIf V, 116 S. Ct. at 2272-73 (describing the district court's conclusion, as
well as the circuit court's affirmation of the conclusion, that VWIL met the equal pro-
tection requirements despite differences between VMI and VWIL, because the state
was not required to provide a mirror-image VMI for women). But cf. Sweatt v. Painter,
339 U.S. 629 (1950) (holding that an African-American rejected by the University of
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tion, appeared to use a more deferential level of scrutiny than gender
discrimination jurisprudence requires."3  The court then supple-
mented intermediate scrutiny by gauging the "substantive compara-
bility" of VMI and VWIL. It held that although a VWIL degree "lacks
the historical benefit and prestige" of a VMI degree, the educational
opportunities offered by the two schools were "sufficiently compara-
ble.""
4
The Supreme Court, however, disagreed with the lower courts
and held that "the Constitution's equal protection guarantee pre-
cludes Virginia from reserving exclusively to men the unique educa-
tional opportunities that VMI affords."" 5 As did the lower courts, the
Supreme Court relied on Hogan as "the closest guide.""6 The Court
perceived two issues. The manner in which it phrased the first issue
Texas Law School solely because of his race, and instead, offered admission to a segre-
gated law school which is not substantially equal to the University of Texas in its edu-
cational opportunities, must be admitted to the University of Texas Law School).
"1 See V'MIIV, 44 F.3d 1229, 1236 (4th Cir. 1995) (noting that the court would de-
termine the legitimacy of Virginia's purpose "deferentially"); see also Mandelbaum, su-
pra note 101, at 9-12 (charging the Fourth Circuit "affirmed the lowering of the appli-
cable standard to unprecedented depths, inventing out of whole cloth a 'special'
intermediate scrutiny test").
"4 VM1'IV, 44 F.3d at 1241. The dissent vigorously argued that the Constitution
required more than the majority's version of "substantive comparability." Judge Phil-
lips argued that the only way the state could have survived the rigors of the Equal Pro-
tection Clause would have been to "simultaneously open[] single-gender undergradu-
ate institutions having substantially comparable curricular and extra-curricular
programs, funding, physical plant, administration and support services, and faculty
and library resources." VMIIV, 44 F.3d at 1250 (Phillips,J., dissenting).
When the Fourth Circuit denied rehearing of the case en banc, Judge Motz's dis-
senting opinion expressed agreement with Judge Phillips's earlier dissent and added:
[H]ow can a degree from a yet to be implemented supplemental program at
Mary Baldwin be held "substantively comparable" to a degree from a vener-
able Virginia military institution that was established more than 150 years
ago? ... Women need not be guaranteed equal "results,"... but the Equal
Protection Clause does require equal opportunity... [and] that opportunity
is being denied here.
V! V, 52 F.3d 90, 92-93 (4th Cir. 1995) (Motz, J., dissenting) (denying petition for
reh'g en banc).
W4 1V/, 116 S. Ct. at 2269.
16 Id. at 2271. In Virginia, the Supreme Court described Hogan as holding that a
party seeking to uphold government action based on sex must establish an
"exceedingly persuasive justification" for the classification. To succeed, the defender
of the challenged action must show "at least that the classification serves important
governmental objectives and that the discriminatory means employed are substantially
related to the achievement of those objectives." Id. (citation omitted) (quoting Missis-
sippi Univ. for Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718, 724 (1982)).
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suggested the answer: "[D]oes Virginia's exclusion of women from
the educational opportunities provided by VMI-extraordinary op-
portunities for military training and civilian leadership develop-
ment-deny to women 'capable of all of the individual activities re-
quired of VMI cadets,' the equal protection of the laws guaranteed by
the Fourteenth Amendment?""' 7 The second issue involved the ap-
propriate remedy if "VMI's 'unique' situation-as Virginia's sole sin-
gle-sex public institution of higher education" violated the Equal Pro-
tection Clause." 8 The Court began its analysis with a rationalization
of the "skeptical scrutiny" utilized to combat sex discrimination, not-
ing that it "responds to volumes of history."" 9
Virginia offered two justifications for the classification, neither of
which the Court found persuasive. First, Virginia argued that its pur-
pose in maintaining an all-male VMI was to further "diversity in edu-
cational approaches. " 12° The Court, refusing to accept such a benign
justification without further inquiry, examined the claimed purpose
and concluded that the interest in educational diversity was not Vir-
ginia's actual purpose in maintaining VMI.121 Moreover, the Court re-
fused to believe that VMI truly furthered a variety of educational op-
tions because the school only accrued benefit to males. '2 "However
17 See id. at 2274 (quoting Virginia, 766 F. Supp. at 1412 (citation omitted)).
118 Id. (citation omitted).
119 Id. at 2274-75. The Court reviewed women's delayed achievement of suffrage;
the former rational basis standard previously used by the Supreme Court to deny
women equal opportunity; and the more recent recognition by the Court that "neither
federal nor state government acts compatibly with the equal protection principle
when a law or official policy denies to women, simply because they are women, full
citizenship stature-equal opportunity to aspire, achieve, participate in and contribute
to society based on their individual talents and capacities." Id.
120 See id. at 2276 (quoting Brief for Cross-Petitioners at 25).
121 See id. at 2277 ("Neither recent nor distant history bears out Virginia's alleged
pursuit of diversity through single-sex educational options."). Although the Court ac-
knowledged that a wide variety of public schools could "serve the public good," the
Court also emphasized that this instance did not present the question of the state
"evenhandedly ... support[ing] diverse educational opportunities," but rather a case
where a "unique" educational opportunity is reserved for one sex. See id. at 2276 n.7,
2277. One critic argues that in prior cases, it seemed that the purported inquiry into
the legitimacy of the state's motive was an "empty construct"-statutes had previously
only fallen by it when the classification also failed to substantially advance the state's
goal. See The Supreme Court, 1995 Term-Leading Cases, 110 HARV. L. REV. 135, 183 (1996)
[hereinafter Leading Cases]. In VA, the critic argues, the Court acknowledged that
the "discriminatory policy directly promoted effective college education," but still per-
formed the actual-purpose inquiry. Id. The critic argues that this analysis "threatens
to transform the Supreme Court into a 'council of revision.'" Id.
See VMI V, 116 S. CL at 2279 (stating that VMI's plan to provide educational
benefit to males would require accommodations that would prove fatal to the pro-
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'liberally' this plan serves the State's sons, it makes no provision what-
ever for her daughters. That is not equal protection."'23
Virginia also argued that the beneficial adversative method em-
ployed by VMI would suffer major alterations if women were admitted
to the school. This, the State contended, would harm both men
and women. Men would suffer because no longer would they be able
to obtain the unique training. Women would suffer because their
participation would cause the program to lose its distinctive charac-
ter.'25 Although the Supreme Court acknowledged that VMI would
have to make some accommodations for women, 26 the Court empha-
sized repeatedly that " [n] either the goal of producing citizen-soldiers
nor VMI's implementing methodology is inherently unsuitable to
women." 27 Furthermore, while acknowledging the existence of some
"inherent differences" between the sexes, the Court emphasized that
these characteristics "remain cause for celebration," not denigration,
and not as a basis to deny opportunities.'28
Moreover, the Court rejected the "findings" that the district court
made regarding "gender-based developmental differences" which
were based on "opinions about typically male or typically female
'tendencies. ' " '2 In doing so, the Court reiterated an important lesson
grain)-
mId.
124 See id. Professor Mary M. Cheh responds to the argument as follows:
To say that if women were admitted, their admission would change the expe-
rience is like saying that, if I moved, I would have a new address .... Yes,
there would be a change, but the question is whether the change would be
relevant and, if so, to what? If the aim is to produce citizen soldiers, to build
character and esprit de corps, the relevant finding would have to be that can
only be done effectively by the VMI adversative methodology in a single-
gender context .... The very existence of the coeducational military acade-
mies refutes this argument.
Mary M. Cheh, An Essay on VMI and Militariy Service: Yes, We Do Have to Be Equal Together,
50 WASH. & LEEL. REV. 49,53-54 (1993).
12 See VAM_ 1,, 116 S. Ct. at 2279 (stating Virginia's reasoning that the admittance
of women into VMI would harm men and women). But see Bob Twigg, VAI to Change
Little for Women, USA TODAY, Sept. 23, 1996, at 3A (reporting that the only modifica-
tions VMI will make are curtains and separate showers and that women will have to get
buzz cuts). The Court recognized this argument to be the same "self-fulfilling
prophes[y]" used to impede women's progress to opportunities like a military, law or
police career. VMI V, 116S. Ct. at 2280-81.
126 See VAM VT, 116 S. Ct. at 2279 (noting that the main accommodations would in-
clude changes in housing and physical training programs for women).
127 Id. at 2269.
128 Id. at 2276.
12 Id. at 2279 (quoting VM 1, 766 F. Supp. 1407, 1434-35 (W.D. Va. 1991)
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from previous gender-discrimination cases: "State actors controlling
gates to opportunity ... may not exclude qualified individuals based
on 'fixed notions concerning the roles and abilities of males and fe-
males." 3 ' Because the State's proffered generalizations about the de-
sires and abilities of each sex were not uniformly correct, the State
could not deny to women an opportunity available to men, because
some women will fall outside the mold. The Court determined that
VMI's real mission is "to produce 'citizen-soldiers,'" and "that goal is
great enough to accommodate women."'s' In the parlance of inter-
mediate scrutiny, the Court held that maintaining VMI as an all-male
school did not substantially relate to the interests of producing citi-
zen-soldiers or the preservation of the adversative method.' 2
In the second part of the opinion, the Court dismissed VWIL as
an inadequate remedy because it did not respond closely enough to
the constitutional violation.3 3 The Court chastised Virginia for creat-
ing for women a "program fairly appraised as a 'pale shadow' of VMI
in terms of the range of curricular choices and faculty stature, fund-
ing, prestige, alumni support and influence.' 3 4 The Court concluded
(observing that one of the "tendencies" accepted by the district court was that
"'[m]ales tend to need an atmosphere of adversativeness' while '[f]emales tend to
thrive in a cooperative atmosphere'") (alteration in original) (quoting VH , 766 F.
Supp. at 1434-35)).
Id. at 2280 (quoting Mississippi Univ. for Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718,
725(1982)) (noting also that courts should take a "hard look" at purported
.tendencies").
1 Id. at 2281-82 (quoting VMII, 766 F. Supp. at 1425).
132 One might also question the importance of the state's interest in maintaining
the adversative method. Justice Rehnquist's concurrence clearly stated that this objec-
tive does not rank as important. See id. at 2290 (Rehnquist, CJ., concurring)
("[M]aintenance of the adversative method ... does not serve an important govern-
mental objective."). Professor Finley, writing about the VMI litigation in the lower
courts, described how the adversative method and other characteristics of VMI es-
caped scrutiny. See Lucinda M. Finley, Sex-Blind, Separate but Equal, or Anti-
Subordination? The Uneasy Legacy of Plessy v. Ferguson for Sex and Gender Discrimination,
12 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 1089, 1110-13 (1996) ("The norm at issue-VMI itself, its struc-
tures, methods, values, and social significance as a means for maintaining notions of
masculinity and masculine privilege-escaped serious scrutiny. The correctness or
naturalness of the male standard of VMI was assumed....").
iss See VMI VI, 116 S. Ct. at 2282 (observing that previous cases have required that
remedial measures "must be shaped to place persons unconstitutionally denied an
opportunity... in 'the position they would have occupied in the absence of
[discrimination]'" (alteration in original) (quoting Milliken v Bradley, 433 U.S. 267,
280 (1977))).
134 Id. at 2285 (quoting V1M I, 44 F.3d 1229, 1250 (1995) (Phillips, J., dissent-
ing)). The Court analogized VWIL to the law school that Texas set up for African
Americans in Sweatt v. Painter, 339 U.S. 629 (1950): "In line with Sweatt, we rule here
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that "[w] omen seeking and fit for a VMI-quality education cannot be
offered anything less, under the State's obligation to afford them
genuinely equal protection.
Rehnquist's concurrence focused mainly on the Court's repeated
invocation of the phrase "exceedingly persuasive justification," which
he believed obfuscated the intermediate level of scrutiny.36 He also
avowed that he did not believe the Equal Protection Clause prohib-
ited separate but equal single-sex schools, "if the two institutions of-
fered the same quality of education and were of the same overall cali-
ber.
, 37
The sole dissenter, Justice Scalia, accused the majority of secretly
supplanting intermediate level scrutiny with strict scrutiny, evinced by
its repeated use of the "exceedingly persuasive justification" phrase.'3
He argued that the majority's emphasis on "some women" contra-
dicted previous gender discrimination jurisprudence which required
only that the classification "substantially relate" to the state interest
and not necessarily by the least restrictive means.5 3 Justice Scalia be-
lieved that Virginia easily passed the intermediate scrutiny test.1 40 .
that Virginia has not shown substantial equality in the separate educational opportuni-
ties the state supports at VWIL and VMI." Id. at 2286.
135 Id. at 2287.
16 See id. at 2288 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring) ("While terms like 'important gov-
ernmental objective' and 'substantially related' are hardly models of precision, they
have more content and specificity than does the phrase 'exceedingly persuasive justifi-
cation.'"). Justice Rehnquist opined that the phrase "exceedingly persuasive justifica-
tion" should only be used "as an observation on the difficulty of meeting the applica-
ble test, not as a formulation of the test itself." Id.
137 Id. at 2291 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring) (concluding that VWIL simply is not,
in any sense, the institution that VMI is").
See id. at 2294 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (discussing how the United States asked
the Court to apply strict scrutiny to gender classifications and that "[t]he Court, while
making no reference to the government's argument, effectively accepts it").
See id. at 2294-95 (Scalia, J., dissenting) ("The reasoning in our other interme-
diate-scrutiny cases has [not] required... a perfect fit."). But see Udell, supra note 95,
at 553 (arguing that Justice Scalia's contention "that the majority conducted a 'least-
restrictive-means analysis' in an effort to accomodate only [a few women] seeking en-
try to VMI overlooked (1) the fact that over 300 women sought to apply to VMI in the
two years prior to the lawsuit, and (2) sex-based differences in the average do notjus-
tify discrimination" (footnotes omitted)).
140 Justice Scalia argued: "It is beyond question that Virginia has an important
state interest in providing effective college education for its citizens. That single-sex
instruction is an approach substantially related to that interest should be evident
enough from the long and continuing history in this country of men's and women's
colleges." VMT V, 116 S. Ct. at 2296 (Scalia, J., dissenting). As the Court noted in
Hogan, this argument is not responsive to the question of why the benefit is only con-
ferred on one gender. See Mississippi Univ. for Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718, 731
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Like Justice Powell in Hogan, Justice Scalia argued that the State
also had an important interest in providing a diverse educational sys-
tem. He criticized the majority's dismissal of the diversity justifica-
tion, saying that "[t]he apparent theory of this argument is that unless
Virginia pursues a great deal of diversity, its pursuit of some diversity
must be a sham."1
41
The dissent also criticized the majority's disregard of the findings
of the district court on the developmental differences between men
and women "in favor of the Justices' own view of the world."4 1 Scalia
argued that a "legitimate pedagogical basis" existed for the different
approaches employed by VMI and VWIL.' 4  He recounted the trial
testimony about the research and careful planning that Virginia (with
the help of professional educators) engaged in to produce VWIL and
said the "Court simply declares, with no basis in the evidence, that
these professionals acted on '"overbroad" generalizations.""4
He also rejected the idea that the majority could effectively nar-
row its holding by focusing on the "uniqueness" of VMI, believing
that the Court's mode of analysis would always find something unique
about a given institution or program.145
Justice Scalia concluded his dissent by commenting on the recent
movement among educators to experiment with single-sex schools.
He said that the majority opinion did a major disservice to this type of
experimentation, since no school district or state would ever want to
offer diversity in the face of great litigation costs.'4 In sum, he said:
n.17 (1982).
Justice Scalia further argued that offering only men the opportunity for single-sex
education was justifiable because "Virginia's financial resources ... are not limitless"
and VMI maximized these limited resources by allowing the state to "fund one public
all-male institution and one on the adversative model." VA V, 116 S. CL at 2297
(Scalia,J., dissenting). He did not question the district court's conclusion that women
and the adversative method were inherently incompatible. See id. (noting that the dis-
trict court found that the admittance of women would lead to the end of the adversa-
tive method at VMI).
141 VM V, 116 S. CL at 2299 (ScaliaJ., dissenting). This argument fails according
to Scalia, because it ignores Virginia's limited resources and because Virginia gauges
the diversity of its system by looking at both the public and the private offerings, for
which it provides money and other types of support. See id.
142 Id. at 2301.
143 Id. at 2303 (quoting VAIII, 852 F. Supp. 471, 481 (W.D. Va. 1994)).
A Id.
145 See id. at 2305-06 ("I suggest that the single-sex program that will not be capable
of being characterized as 'unique' is not only unique but nonexistent." (footnote
omitted)).
1 See id. at 2306 (discussing Detroit's failed attempt at single-sex education and
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"Today ... change is forced upon Virginia, and reversion to single-sex
education is prohibited nationide, not by democratic processes but
by order of this Court."
47
III. ANALYZING THE CONSTITT[ONALnIY OFYWLS IN LIGHT OF VI
AND THE PRECEDINGJURISPRUDENCE
Despite the Supreme Court's recent invalidation of a single-sex
institution,' the constitutional validity of single-sex public schools is
far from self-evident. Although Justice Scalia forecasted a future sans
the option of publicly funded single-sex schools,49 the majority's em-
phasis on the "unique educational opportunities"' 5 that VMI offered,
suggests the possibility that the dissent may be overstating the major-
ity's holding. Thus, it is not a foregone conclusion that the Young
Women's Leadership School is unconstitutional. The best way to de-
termine the constitutionality of single-sex public schools is to parrot
the Supreme Court's method of analysis. Exploring the issue this way
will illuminate the direction thatjurisprudence in this area will take as
well as reveal the constitutionality of YWLS in particular.
First, this Comment will discuss the proper level of scrutiny with
which to assess the constitutionality of YWLS. Then, this Comment
will discuss and analyze the justifications District Four might offer.
A. Proper Level of Scrutiny
The level of scrutiny employed to judge the constitutional validity
of gender classifications is called "intermediate" or "heightened" scru-
tiny.' 5' As its name implies, it falls on the spectrum between rational
concluding "[t]oday's opinion assures that no such experiment will be tried again").
To emphasize the importance he believes state experimentation should be accorded,
he quoted Justice Brandeis: "[O]ne of the happy incidents of the federal system [is]
that a single courageous state may, if its citizens choose, serve as a laboratory; and try
novel social and economic experiments without risk to the rest of the country." Id. at
2308 (quoting New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932)) (Brandeis, J.,
dissenting). But cf Hsiao, supra note 14, at 114 ("If the Supreme Court had yielded to
local community decisions in Brown, many schools might still be racially segregated by
law." (footnote omitted)).
147 VMIV, 116 S. Ct. at 2293 (Scalia,J., dissenting).
148 See id. at 2287.
1 See id. at 2305 (Scalia, J., dissenting) ("Under the constitutional principles an-
nounced and applied today, single-sex public education is unconstitutional.").
'50 Id. at 2269.
1 See Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 197 (1976) ("[C]lassifications by gender must
serve important government objectives and must be substantially related to achieve-
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basis review' 52 and strict scrutiny.' s' Supporters of this scrutiny level
argue that it allows courts to filter out laws based on invidious stereo-
types while allowing other laws that are based on the so-called "true"
differences that exist between men and women, or, as here, boys and
girls.' 5 Critics claim that this flexibility can lead to unprincipled deci-
sionmaking.'55 Critics also argue that the real point of the Equal Pro-
tection Clause can get lost in all the "substantial" and "important"
rhetoric. 1
6
Whatever its attributes or drawbacks, the Supreme Court ostensi-
bly applied this level of scrutiny in VMT despite the fact that the
United States asked the Court to apply the more stringent strict scru-
tiny.15 7 The Court did, however, reserve for a future case the question
of whether strict scrutiny might ever be applied to gender classifica-
tions.lss Noteworthy was the majority's repeated invocation of the
phrase "exceedingly persuasive justification" which suggests that the
Court might have applied a heightened form of intermediate scrutiny
or, perhaps, even strict scrutiny.'m The higher the level of scrutiny
ment of those objectives.").
2 Courts will not strike down classifications subject to mere rational basis review
so long as there is a "plausible reason" for the classification. See United States R. R.
Retirement Bd. v. Fritz, 449 U.S. 166, 178 (1980) ("Congress could properly conclude
that persons who had actually acquired statutory entitlement to windfall benefits while
still employed ... had a greater equitable claim ... than the members of appellee's
class who were no longer in railroad employment....").
1 Classifications subject to strict scrutiny must be "necessary" to achieve a
.compelling" government interest. See Palmore v. Sidoti, 466 U.S. 429, 434 (1984)
(holding that the "effects of racial prejudice ... cannot justify a racial classification
removing an infant child from the custody of its natural mother found to be an ap-
proriate person to have such custody" (footnote omitted)).
See Anita K. Blair, The Equal Protection Clause and Single-Sex Public Education:
United States v. Virginia and Virginia Military Institute, 6 SETON HALL CONsT. LJ. 999,
1001 (1996) (arguing that strict scrutiny is inappropriate for gender classifications be-
cause unlike in racial classifications, "there are real differences between men and
women .... The only fair way to proceed is to take an open-minded inquiry into the
substance and purpose of the classification").
15. See Bennett L. Saferstein, Note, Revisiting Plessy at the Vrginia Military Institute:
Reconciling Single-Sex Education with Equal Protection, 54 U. PiTr. L. REV. 637, 639-40
(1993) (describing the intermediate scrutiny standard as "'so diaphanous and elastic
as to invite subjective judicial preferences or prejudices ... masquerading as judg-
ments'" (quoting Craig, 429 U.S. at 221 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting)).
I% Id. at 640 ("When unique and valuable educational opportunities are made
available to only one sex, the nebulous intermediate scrutiny standard can be used to
obscure this prima facie denial of equal protection.").
157 See VAWIV, 116 S. Ct. 2264, 2275 (1996).
15 See id.
1 See, e.g., id. at 2294, 2306 (ScaliaJ., dissenting) (claiming that the Court's nine
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that the Court employs, the less likely it is that the YWLS will pass
constitutional muster.' °
For the purposes of this analysis, this Comment assumes that
courts will, at least in form, apply an intermediate level of scrutiny.
The substance, however, is governed by the Supreme Court's reason-
ing in VMT and the other precedent-setting cases. Thus, if courts en-
gage in a heightened form of intermediate scrutiny, the mode of
analysis should reflect it.
The first part of the intermediate scrutiny test focuses on the
state's reason for its discriminatory classification. For the state to
meet its burden, its objective must be deemed "important."'6' Three
vital requirements of this prong are that the interests put forth by the
government be "genuine" and not a purpose concocted "post hoc in
response to litigation. ", 6' Further; the justification must "not rely on
mentions of the phrase resulted in "a redefinition of intermediate scrutiny that makes
it indistinguishable from strict scrutiny"); Cohen v. Brown University, 101 F.3d 155,
190 (1st Cir. 1996) (Torruella, C.J., dissenting) ("Rather than simply apply the tradi-
tional test ... the Supreme Court applied a more searching 'skeptical scrutiny ......
(citation omitted)), petition for cert.fileda 65 U.S.L.W. 3599 (U.S. Feb. 18, 1997) (No. 96-
132 1); see also John J. Ross, The Employment Law Year in Review, 547 PLI/LIT 9, 42
(1996) (arguing that it appears gender classifications will receive more intense scru-
tiny in the future). It should be noted, however, that the VM/Court did not invent the
phrase, "exceedingly persuasive justification," and that the Court in fact, has used it in
numerous precedents. See id. at 183 n.22 ("The phrase 'exceedingly persuasive justifi-
cation' has been employed routinely ... and is, in effect, a short-hand expression of
the well-established [intermediate scrutiny] test." (citing J.E.B. v. Alabama, 511 U.S.
127, 136-37 (1994)); Mississippi Univ. for Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718, 724 (1982);
Kirchberg v. Feenstra, 450 U.S. 455, 461 (1981); Personnel Adm'r v. Feeney, 442 U.S.
256, 273 (1979). Perhaps the middle ground between these two stands most accu-
rately captures the Court's position on the proper level of scrutiny to afford gender
classifications. See Udell, supra note 95, at 553 ("Justice Ginsburg .... is moving the
Court, gradually and strategically, to a point where it will finally endorse strict scrutiny
for gender classifications.").
See Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 11 (1967) ("At the very least, the Equal Pro-
tection Clause demands that [suspect] classifications... be subjected to the 'most
rigid scrutiny,' and, if they are ever to be upheld, they must be shown to be necessary
to the accomplishment of some permissible state objective, independent of
the ... discrimination which it was the object of the Fourteenth Amendment to elimi-
nate." (quoting Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 216 (1944)). But cf Adarand
Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 115 S. Ct. 2097, 2117 (1995) (clarifying that strict scrutiny is
not "fatal in fact" and that "[w]hen race-based action is necessary to further a compel-
ling interest, such action is within constitutional constraints if it satisfies the 'narrow
tailoring' test").
1 See Wengler v. Druggists Mut. Ins. Co., 446 U.S. 142, 150 (1980) ("However the
discrimination is described in this case, our precedents require that gender-based dis-
criminations must serve important governmental objectives ...
162 See VMI V, 116 S. Ct. at 2275; see also Hogan, 458 U.S. at 730 & n.16 (noting that
a state may notjust recite a purpose but has the burden of establishing an actual pur-
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overbroad generalizations about the different talents, capacities, or
preferences of males and females."O Finally, the "mere recitation of
a benign, compensatory purpose" does not prevent "inquiry into the
actual purposes underlying the statutory scheme."'r
The second part of the test requires that the classification itself
substantially relate to the state's accomplishment of its important ob-
jective. 6 When analyzing a case in light of this requirement, it is cru-
cial to remember an enlightening axiom. The Hogan Court, respond-
ing to justice Powell's argument in dissent that providing women with
the choice of single-sex education substantially relates to the goal of
providing diversity, stated:
Since any gender-based classification provides one class a benefit or
choice not available to the other class... that argument begs the ques-
tion. The issue is not whether the benefited class profits from the classi-
fication, but whether the State's decision to confer a benefit only upon
one class by means of a discriminatory classification is substantially re-
lated to achieving a legitimate and substantial goal.
l6
Thus, in the context of single-sex schools, the state must show not
that a single-sex school substantially relates to a beneficial end for the
class advantaged by the classification, but instead, that excluding one
sex from the benefit substantially relates to its goal.
This Comment will consider three purposes that District Four
may assert and analyze whether courts will deem them "important"
and whether the means of single-sex education "substantially relate"
to their accomplishment. Recall that the state has the burden of es-
tablishing "an exceedingly persuasive justification. 167
pose for the classification).
163 VMT V, 116 U.S. at 2275. But see Finley, supra note 132, at 1125 (criticizing the
emphasis on stereotypes because it "keeps the focus on women rather than on the op-
erative male-normed institutions").
16 Weinberger v. Wiesenfeld, 420 U.S. 636, 648 (1975); see also WngLer, 446 U.S. at
147 ("Although the Missouri Supreme Court was of the view that the law favored,
rather than disfavored, women, it is apparent that the statute discriminates against
both men and women.").
'6 See Califano v. Westcott, 443 U.S. 76, 85 (1979).
166 Hogan, 458 U.S. at 731 n.17.
167 See VMI VI, 116S. Ct. at 2274.
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B. Non-Exceedingly Persuasive Justifications
1. Diversity
Diversity and the related goal of experimentation are almost in-
variably brought up by state actors to justify single-sex schools.' s The
poor quality of many of the nation's schools has led reformers at the
state level to argue forcefully that they need leeway to try various edu-
cational experiments.'69 In VMI, the issues of the beneficial effect of
single-sex education on some students and whether diverse educa-
tional choices "can serve the public good" were not contested.70 In-
stead, the Supreme Court rejected Virginia's assertion that the diver-
sity goal actually motivated the State. 7' The Court also indicated that
it will not accept this rationale unless both sexes are benefited by the
169 See, e.g., VMI, 766 F. Supp. 1407 (W.D. Va. 1991) (stating that VMI sought to
justify its exclusion of women as promoting diversity in education). The term
"diversity" has also been frequently used in the affirmative action context to justify ra-
cial classifications. SeeJim Chen, Diversity and Damnation, 43 UCLA L. REV. 1839, 1848
(1996) ("So sweet is 'diversity' to the legal ear that the term has become the preferred
euphemism for the d6class6 phrase 'affirmative action.'"). The interesting twist on the
term here is that in the affirmative action context, diversity stands for the goal of in-
cluding many different voices and experiences in an environment (for example, a
school), so that everyone's educational experience is enriched. See Cheh, supra note
124, at 60. The use of the "diversity" justification differs remarkably when applied to
single-sex schools: "[D)iversity in the VMI context is a reason to exclude, or to isolate
and separate, constituent groups." Id. at 60-61 ("'Diversity' has too many potential
meanings and too many negative possibilities to be blithely accepted as an all-purpose
justification.").
169 See Single-Sex Public Schools, AMERICA, Sept. 14, 1996, at 3, 3 ("[T]he current sys-
tem of compulsory coeducation in most public high schools is not working for many
young boys and girls. Nonsexist experiments with single-sex schools are surely worth a
try."); see also Leo, supra note 27, at 18 ("Why can't we extend to minority and poor
youngsters the same option for single-sex education that well-off parents exercise
when they send their daughters to the fancy, private girls' schools found all over Man-
hattan?"). District Four, where the school is located, has a reputation for educational
innovation. See id. (noting that the district already has 23 alternative schools
"including three concentrating on math and science, two on the performing arts, a
writing school, a prep school and a maritime school").
170 See VAi VI, 116 S. Ct. at 2276-77 ("Single-sex education affords pedagogical
benefits to at least some students ... and that reality is uncontested in this litigation.
Similarly, it is not disputed that diversity among public educational institutions can
serve the public good." (footnote omitted)). At least one commentator asserts that in
these remarks the Court "admitted that.., diverse educational opportunities, includ-
ing single-sex education, could serve important governmental interest." Leading Cases,
supra note 121, at 175. However, "admitted" seems too strongly put-the Court merely
acknowledged that diverse educational opportunities were beneficial, it certainly did
not explicitly say single-sex education qualified as an important governmental interest.
171 See VMI VI, 116 S. Ct. at 2279.
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diversity.'7 2 True educational diversity, it appears, would encompass
something akin to single-sex schools for each sex. If District Four de-
cides to create a counterpart to YWLS for boys, then the issue of the
constitutionality of an evenhandedly diverse system rises to the fore.
a. The Constitutionality of "Separate but Equal" Schooling in the Gender
Context
"Separate but equal," the constitutional doctrine originating in
Plessy v. Ferguson 73 and discredited in Brown v. Board of Education,'74 has
not been rejected or explicitly retained by the Court in the area of sex
discrimination.'75
The reasoning of Brown supports the interpretation that its hold-
ing applies to sex classifications. 76 The VMICourt echoed this under-
i See id. at 2276 n.7 ("We do not question the State's prerogative evenhandedly to
support diverse educational opportunities. We address specifically and only an educa-
tional opportunity recognized ... as 'unique.'" (emphasis added)). For an insightful
analysis and critique of the diversityjustification, see Saferstein, supra note 155, at 656-
57 ("The logical flaw with this argument is that it substitutes the means for the ends in
the scrutiny formula. The object is not to attain diversity per se, but to attain the best
possible educational system.").
73 163 U.S. 537, 551 (1896) (holding "separate but equal" treatment not violative
of the Equal Protection Clause).
174 347 U.S. 483, 495 (1954) (overturning the "separate but equal" doctrine and
holding that "separate educational facilities are inherently unequal").
17 Although the Court summarily affirmed the Third Circuit's decision in
Vorchheimer v. School Dist., 532 F.2d 880 (3d Cir. 1976), affd ly an equally divided
Court, 430 U.S. 703 (1977), which relied on "separate but equal" reasoning, the Su-
preme Court's reasoning for doing so is not known. See supra Part ILA2. The Court
declined to address the constitutionality of "separate but equal" systems in both
Hogan, 458 U.S. at 720 n.1 ("[W]e are not faced with the question of whether States
can provide 'separate but equal' undergraduate institutions for males and females.")
and VM.I V, 116 S. Ct. at 2276 n.7 ("We do not question the State's prerogative even-
handedly to support diverse educational opportunities. We address specifically and
only an educational opportunity recognized.., as 'unique.'"). See also Patricia Werner
Lamar, Comment, The Expansion of Constitutional and Statutory Remedies for Sex Segrega-
tion in Education: The Fourteenth Amendment and Title IX of the Education Amendments of
1972, 32 EMoRYL.J. 1111, 1113 (1983) (arguing that in Hogan, the Supreme Court was
able to avoid the "separate but equal" issue because the male plaintiff did not claim
that the state had a duty to create an all-male nursing school). Despite the Court's
vagueness regarding its position on "separate but equal" in the sex context, some crit-
ics argue that the assumptions embedded in the doctrine maintain a strong hold over
sex discrimination jurisprudence. See Finley, supra note 132, at 1089 ("[W] hen one
focuses on the jurisprudence of equality on the basis of sex or gender, it appears that
far from being buried, Plessy is quite alive and well.").
176 See Brown, 347 U.S. at 495 ("[In the field of public education the doctrine of
'separate but equal' has no place. Separate educational facilities are inherently une-
qual."); Sharon K. Mollman, Note, The Gender Gap: Separating the Sexes in Public Educa-
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standing when it quoted scholars who likened all-male institutions to
all-white institutions, implying thatjust as the latter reinforces ideas of
white supremacy, the former contributes to the perpetuation of a pa-
triarchal society.77 Thus, the possibility exists that the Court would
find separate but equal schooling to be inherently defective, as it did
in the racial context.
Other aspects of the VM! opinion point in the opposite direction.
For instance, the Court evaluated VWIL's adequacy as a remedy using
analysis gleaned from Sweatt v. Painter."" Sweatt, decided under the
separate but equal doctrine, held that the University of Texas had to
open its doors to African-American students because the parallel law
school that Texas established was not equal, as evaluated by tangible
and intangible characteristics.'"9 In VMI, the Court made clear that if
separate educational facilities for men and women have any hope of
passing constitutional muster, the State must demonstrate "substantial
equality in the separate educational opportunities."' 80 One can un-
derstand the majority's invocation of Sweatt and its analysis to imply
that the separate but equal doctrine is appropriate in the gender dis-
crimination context. If the Court really wanted to disavow the doc-
trine, it could have done so and foregone the second half of the opin-
ion.
The VM! Court also quoted at length from Fourth Circuit Court
of Appeals Judge Phillips's dissenting opinion, which argued that
separate but equal institutions were acceptable so long as they were
"substantially comparable" in all aspects.'8 ' Other language in the
tion, 68 IND. L.J. 149, 157 (1992) ("The anti-subordination basis for Brown's abrogation
of separate but equal schools in the racial context supports its elimination in the gen-
der context as well."); see also Faulkner v. Jones, 51 F.3d 440, 450 (4th Cir. 1995) (Hall,
J., concurring) (arguing that separate educational facilities "will inevitably fall short of
providing women their deserved access to important avenues of power and responsi-
bilit-).
See VAI V, 116 S. Ct. at 2277 n.8 (quoting CHRISTOPHER JENCKS & DAVID
RIEsriAN, THEACADEMICREVOLUTION 297-98 (1968)).
178 339 U.S. 629 (1950).
179 See id. at 633-36, 634 ("[T]he University of Texas Law School possesses to a far
greater degree those qualities which are incapable of objective measurement ....
Such qualities ... include reputation of the faculty, experience of the administration,
position and influence of the alumni, standing in the community, traditions and pres-
tige.").
iso VA! V, 116 S. Ct. at 2286 (citing Sweatt, 339 U.S. at 636); see also Women Pris-
oners v. District of Columbia, 93 F.3d 910, 955 (D.C. Cir. 1996) (Rogers, J., dissenting)
("Even assuming the government may constitutionally provide separate but equal pro-
grams for the sexes, the programs must be substantially equivalent.").
1 See VAIIV, 44 F.3d 1229, 1250 (4th Cir. 1995). For an analysis of the proper
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opinion suggests that the Court might be amenable theoretically to
the prospect of separate but equal schools in the sex context. The
Court limited its holding by noting that VMI was "unique" in Vir-
ginia. 1 2 One meaning of "unique" found in the opinion was that VMI
was the sole single-sex school in the state.s3 Thus, the limitation
might suggest that a separate but (truly) equal counterpart to VMI
would have alleviated the constitutional violation.
Even if the Court decided that Brown's reasoning does not pro-
hibit separate but equal arrangements in the sphere of sex classifica-
tions, as a practical matter, few, if any, separate but equal school sys-
tems would pass muster. As the design of YWLS and Detroit's
Academies demonstrate, school districts tailor their single-sex schools
to perceived "tendencies" of the sex for whom the school is intended.
It is likely that single-sex schools promulgated by school districts will
contain disparate programs depending on the sex for whom the
school was designed. The VMI Court explicitly frowned upon reli-
ance on such generalizations1 4 by disregarding the findings of the
district court on female and male preferences and differences and
noting that some women have the drive and capability to be a VMI ca-
det: "It is on behalf of these women that the United States has insti-
tuted this suit, and it is for them that a remedy must be crafted."'85
This reasoning applies to the possible all-boys counterpart that
District Four is considering. Unless District Four reproduces YWLS in
all or nearly all of the school's many tangible and intangible charac-
teristics, MG the purpose of diversity would not justify denying a claim-
ant an educational benefit the other sex enjoyed. Once again, even if
manner to determine whether institutions are truly equal, see Saferstein, supra note
155, at 669-72 (proposing a balancing test which weighs the benefits of the single-sex
environment against the burdens placed on the sex "relegated to the lesser of the two
schools"). But see Women Prisoners, 93 F.3d at 926 (interpreting VM to require compa-
rable funding and curriculum scope, but not identical programs).
182 Off W, 116 S. Ct. at 2276 & n.7 ("We address specifically and only an educa-
tional opportunity recognized... as 'unique,' an opportunity available at Virginia's
premier military institute, the State's sole single-sex public university or college."
(citation omitted)).
183 In framing the case's second issue, the Court asked whether "VMI's 'unique'
situation-as Virginia's sole single-sex public institution of higher education-offends
the Constitution's equal protection principle." Id. at 2274 (citation omitted).
184 See id. at 2280 ("[W]e have cautioned reviewing courts to take a 'hard look' at
generalizations or 'tendencies' of the kind pressed by Virginia . ..
18' Id. at 2284.
186 Unlike VMI, YWLS has not existed long enough to make it impossible for an
incipient boys school to attain substantial equality as measured by intangible factors
like its reputation and prestige.
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the Court would consider diversity to be "important," the Court will
only consider the State's actual purpose to be the promotion of edu-
cational diversity when the benefits are allotted evenhandedly and
when the offerings are "substantially equal." A true diversity objective
thus merges into separate but equal analysis.
b. The Efficacy of the "Unique"Limitation
This merger exposes the thinness of the "unique" limitation,
which the Court suggested constrained its holding. I7  The word
"unique" appears to have two definitions in the VM! opinion. First,
the Court uses it to mean "Virginia's sole single-sex institution of
higher education."'8 Second, it means that no remotely comparable
educational opportunities existed for women in Virginia!9  But for
the sex of their students, two schools that are considered separate but
equal, are, by definition, not "unique." If East Harlem sets up an all-
boys counterpart to YWLS, the foregoing analysis of the separate but
equal principle will govern. If the boys school was not "substantially
equal," the district could not hope to win with the diversity rationale.
At present, however, YWLS fits the first definition of "unique" be-
cause it is the sole single-sex school offered by District Four. Recall
that District Four sought to ensure that YWLS offered nothing unique
(by offering enhanced math, science and leadership classes at other
district schools). Nonetheless, YWLS most likely remains "unique"
according to the second definition employed by the VMJ Court, be-
cause no other district school likely offers all the tangible and intan-
gible benefits that YWLS offers its students, such as class size, 9 ' teach-
ing method,'9 ' facilities' 92 and atmosphere.'9 A male applicant denied
admission to YWLS would have a strong claim against the school be-
cause he was denied something he could not get elsewhere.
9 4
187 See supra note 182 and accompanying text.
IN See VMI VI, 116 S. Ctat 2274.
1 See id. at 2283 (noting that VWIL failed to offer to women the type of training
and environment that made VMI distinctive).
190 See, e.g., Steinberg, supra note 17, at 21; Henry, supra note 2, at 1D.
191 See Sanchez, supra note 6, at A8 (connecting the change in teaching methods
with recent studies showing "that girls and boys tend to respond to different teaching
styles").
192 SeeWillen, supra note 8, at A68.
193 SeeSteinberg, supra note 17, at 21.
194 In Hogan, the plaintiff's burden was rooted in convenience. MUW housed the
closest nursing school to his home and job. Thus, although MUW offered nothing
unique, he demonstrated an injury or burden placed upon him solely because of his
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The "unique" limitation is also seriously circumscribed by the
Hogan Court's analysis. Although the VMT Court did emphasize VMI's
uniqueness, the Hogan Court spoke in broader terms: "Because the
challenged policy expressly discriminates among applicants on the
basis of gender, it is subject to scrutiny under the Equal Protection
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment."'9 5 This implies that no real
burden (other than the denial of admission to a school solely on the
basis of sex) need be demonstrated by the plaintiff.' 6 This analysis
renders the "unique" limitation all but meaningless.
In sum, the Court's stance on "separate but equal" cannot be de-
finitively discerned. If it ultimately decides to accept the principle in
the sex discrimination sphere while at the same time remaining faith-
ful to its reasoning in Hogan and VMI, the concept will not ensure the
opening of many single-sex schools. Likewise, the "unique" limitation
faces similar constraints when examined in light of the Court's gen-
eral analysis. Since the Court will not recognize the importance of
the diversity justification unless the State provides "substantially
equal" and nonunique educational opportunities, YWLS is not likely
to win on this argument.
2. Improving the Quality of Education
District Four could also argue that coeducational schools do not
always serve the needs of its students and that some students would
benefit from a single-sex educational environment. In the VMI opin-
ion the Supreme Court did not challenge the notion that educational
benefits might flow from single-sex education.'" The Court also re-
sex. See Mississippi Univ. for Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718, 724 n.8 (1982) ("Hogan's
female colleagues had available an opportunity, not open to Hogan .... The policy of
denying males the right to obtain credit toward a baccalaureate degree thus imposed
upon Hogan 'a burden he would not bear were he female.'" (quoting Orr v. Orr, 440
U.S. 268, 273 (1979))).
195 Hogan, 458 U.S. at 723.
19 But ef. Saferstein, supra note 155, at 682 (arguing that if school districts set up
three experimental academies simultaneously, one for girls, one for boys, and one co-
ed, equal protection would be satisfied because "[b]y ensuring that every educational
opportunity available to one sex is also made available to the other sex, the project
cannot be said to discriminate in favor of either sex").
197 See VAM V, 116 S. Ct. at 2276-77 ("Single-sex education affords pedagogical
benefits to at least some students .... "). But cf. Faulkner, 51 F.3d at 451 (Hall,J., con-
curring) ("[T]hough VMI, The Citadel, and their advocates have ceaselessly insisted
that education is at the heart of the debate, I suspect that these cases have very little to
do with education. They instead have very much to do with wealth, power, and the
ability of those who have it now to determine who will have it later.").
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ferred to the district court's finding that women appear to flourish
more than men in a single-sex setting.0 But, as shown above, the
Court requires states to "evenhandedly" distribute benefits to the
sexes, 199 and the school district here does not yet offer an all-male al-
ternative. Thus, if a school like YWLS wants to succeed on this argu-
ment, it must establish that girls do not receive optimal education
under the current system.2 O Correspondingly, it would need to dem-
onstrate that under a system where girls had a single-sex option, boys
would not be denied any benefit because boys thrive in co-
201educational settings which the State already offers.
198 See Vfi W, 116 S. Ct. at 2277 n.8 (noting the district court's finding that
"beneficial effects [of single-sex education] are stronger among women than among
men"); cf. FLORENCE HOWE, MYTHS OF COEDUCATION 209 (1984) ("Coeducation ...
functions within the patriarchal limits of the society in which it exists.").
199 See generaUy Barbara Anne Murphy, Education: An Illusion for Women, 3 S. CAL.
REV. L. & WOMEN's STUD. 19, 24 (1993) ("The crime is not that female students do not
receive the 'same' education as male students, but that this deficiency alters women's
identity for their entire lives."). Although some commentators point to statistics show-
ing women's majority status in colleges and graduate schools as proof that public edu-
cation does not discriminate, it is informative that "the average woman with a college
degree earns the same as a man with only a high school diploma." Id. at 23. Murphy
also argues that schools socialize girls and "impose upon girls a restricting set of sexual
stereotypes that discourage their aspirations and limit their sense of autonomy and
self-image." Id. at 27 (citation omitted). But see Blair, supra note 154, at 1009-12
(attempting to show statistically that women are "emancipated," not economically and
politically powerless citizens).
20 Students at YWLS report that when they attended co-ed public school they no-
ticed preferential treatment of male students and that male students dominated class-
room discussion. See Sanchez, supra note 6, at A8 (quoting a female student who
noted that in YWLS she no longer spends time "'groveling all day at the feet of some
guy'"); see also AMERICAN ASS'N OF UNIV. WOMEN, THE AAUW REPORT: HOW SCHOOLS
SHORTCHANGE GIRLS at v (1992) [hereinafter How SCHOOLS SHORTCHANGE GIRLS]
(contending that there is "compelling evidence that girls are not receiving the same
quality, or even quantity, of education as their brothers"). But see Leo, supra note 27,
at 18 (repudiating the 1992 AAUW study that found large educational inequities as
politicized and highly misleading, and noting that a more balanced study found that
"'not all academic outcomes favor boys, nor are they as large as some recent public
discussions would imply'" (quoting Valerie Lee, author of the more recent study)).
201 See Beth Willinger, Speeches: Single Gender Education and the Constitution, 40 LOY.
L. REV. 253, 255-58 (1994) (discussing her research, which suggests that women bene-
fit tremendously from single-sex education while men "[b]asically... have the same
educational experience"); see also Parenting Today (CNN television broadcast, Oct. 26,
1996) ("'Teachers teach boys and girls differently. So, sitting next to each other in the
same room, boys get a far more intense education than girls.'" (quoting David Sad-
ker)). But see Rogers Worthington, Milwaukee Idea Shapes a New Schoo4 CHI. TRIB., Dec.
1, 1991, at 25C, 31C ("[B]lack boys are a special-needs population who aren't being
served in public schools 'as they exist.'" (quoting a senior research associate at the
clearinghouse on urban education at Columbia Teachers College)).
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However, the language in VM that emphasized individual
"talents, capacities, or preferences" 20 2 makes it probable that courts
will not want or be able to rely on generalizations about "all boys" and
the type of educational setting in which they would thrive. 03 Since
there are studies that indicate, and scholars who advocate, that boys
204might benefit from single-sex education, courts would reject this
purpose.
Vocal critics of the idea that separating girls is the only way to im-
prove their education agree with the Court's disdain for stereotypes
based on supposed biological differences and antiquated ideas about
gender roles. They argue that such classifications inevitably rely on,
and therefore further perpetuate, invidious notions (such as "girls are
bad at math" and "boys are disruptive") that would become even fur-
ther entrenched if courts accepted the "improving education" pur-
205pose as legitimate.
VA- MV, 116 S. Ct at 2275.
See id. at 2269 ("Neither the goal of producing citizen-soldiers nor VMI's im-
plementing methodology is inherently unsuitable to women. And the school's im-
pressive record in producing leaders has made admission desirable to some women."
(emphasis added)).
- See, e.g., GROSSMAN & GROSSMAN, supra note 8, at 147 ("[M]ales also gain from
attending all-male elementary and secondary schools."); Kristin S. Caplice, The Case for
Public Single-Sex Education, 18 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 227, 287-88 (1994) ("[C]o-
educational institutions do precious little to emphasize basic male development and
character-building .... Both sexes stand to benefit from an educational program that
is sensitive to their unique educational and social needs."). But see Mollman, supra
note 176, at 167 ("Boys in co-ed classes.., gain a higher opinion of themselves and of
their gender, increasing their self-esteem.").
20. SeeJanine Zuniga, Civil Rights Groups Fight Girls-Only Schoo4 RECORD (N.J.), Aug.
23, 1996, at A4, available in 1996 WL 6104766 (quoting Michael Meyers, a New York
Civil Rights Coalition attorney, as saying "'children will be taught... that the mere
presence of boys in the same classroom is a disruptive influence'" (alteration in origi-
nal)); see also Mollman, supra note 176, at 169 ("The social cost of excluding boys is not
their subsequent feelings of inferiority, for their sense of power is too well entrenched.
Instead they perceive that girls are inferior because they will not compete with boys.");
cf. Opposing All-Male Admission Policy at Virginia Military Institute: Amicus Curiae Brief of
Professor Carol Gilligan and the Program on Gender, Science, and Law, 16 WOMEN'S RTS. L.
REP. 1, 10 (1994) ("The record is thus replete with classic, time-worn generalizations
picturing women as passive, men as aggressive; women as peaceful, men as violent;
women as cooperative, men as competitive; women as 'connected,' men as independ-
ent; women as consensus-builders, men as authoritarian."); cf. also Hsiao, supra note
14, at 109 ("[Tlhe perception that African American females are far outperforming
African American males educationally and socially not only ignores the equally press-
ing problems faced by females, but also may prove stigmatizing and demoralizing for
males....").
This problem of harming rather than helping the class singled out by a classifica-
tion plagues benign classifications. In Weinberger v. Wiesenfeld 420 U.S. 636, 643
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Furthermore, the new trend of many educators to turn to single-
sex education as a means of fixing public education shifts the focus
away from the real obstacles facing inner-city youth,0 6 such as poverty,
crime, unemployment and numerous other societal ills.2 7 And, as the
district'court in Garrett v. Board of Education noted, the absence of one
sex, rather than the enhanced educational offerings, will undoubtedly
208receive the credit for a single-sex program's success.
IV. THE EXCEEDINGLY PERSUASIVEJUSTIFICATION: COMPENSATION
A. YWLS Serves a Compensatory Purpose
The third justification the State may argue is that YWLS serves a
20D.compensatory purpose. In VM, the Court acknowledged the possi-
(1975), Congress passed an amendment designed to protect the family unit. While
the amendment made ample provisions for widows with children, "no benefits what-
ever were made available to husbands or widowers on the basis of their wives' covered
employment." Id. at 643-44. Although the government proffered a compensatory
purpose, the operation of the classification in actuality had a "pernicious" effect for
women: "[S]he not only failed to receive for her family the same protection which a
similarly situated male worker would have received, but she was also deprived of a por-
tion of her own earnings in order to contribute to the fund out of which benefits
would be paid to others." Id. at 645; see also Wengler v. Druggists Mut. Ins. Co., 446
U.S. 142, 147 (1980) (noting that a Missouri law discriminated against both sexes be-
cause men only sometimes got a death benefit and "[t] he benefits.., that the working
women c[ould] expect to be paid to her spouse in the case of her work-related death
[we]re less than those payable to the spouse of the deceased male wage earner").
Ruth Bader Ginsburg, as a lawyer, sought to expose this double-edged quality to be-
nign classifications. See Udell, supra note 95, at 527.
206 See Garrett v. Board of Educ., 775 F. Supp. 1004, 1007 (E.D. Mich. 1991)
(reiterating the plaintiffs' argument that the defendant school board's data "ignores
the fact that all children in the Detroit public schools face significant obstacles to suc-
cess" (emphasis added)); cf. Truely & Davis, supra note 5, at 737-38 (arguing that an
"anti-female ideology" underlies many of the new proposals aimed at improving inner-
city public education).
-0 SeeTruely & Davis, supra note 5, at 726 (noting that African-American inner-city
youths are disproportionately affected by unemployment, homelessness and crime).
208 See supra notes 90-91 and accompanying text; see also, e.g., Hsiao, supra note 14,
at 111-12 ("The all-male classroom experiments do not demonstrate that the success
of these males depends on excluding females; rather, they show the potential of high
quality education for those children who receive it."); MichaelJohn Weber, Immersed in
an Educational Crisis: Alternative Programs for African-American Males, 45 STAN. L. REV.
1099, 1118 (1993) (noting that critics of African-American boys schools fear that "the
all-male factor will receive disproportional credit for the success").
2009 For a comprehensive discussion on benign, compensatory purposes for dis-
criminatory classifications, see Fred von Lohmann, Note, Single-Sex Courses, Title IX and
Equal Protection: The Case for Self-Defense for Women, 48 STAN. L REV. 177 (1995)
(arguing that because of the disproportionate amount of sexual violence directed at
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bility that a compensatory rationale might be an "exceedingly persua-
sive justification" when it noted that classifications based on sex might
be permissible where they compensate women for "particular eco-
nomic disabilities," further equal opportunity, or "advance full devel-
opment of the talent and capacities of our Nation's people."210  In
Hogan, the Court also acknowledged that a compensatory purpose
might be proper.2 The discrimination that the district seeks to rem-
edy might be educational or societal,2 2 however, the Court requires
that there be a fairly tight means-end fit.21s This means not only that
the discriminatory classification must be substantially related to the
State's goals but also that the class discriminated against has played a
214role in creating the benefited class's situation. In Hogan, the state
of Mississippi put forth a benign, compensatory purpose to justify its
maintenance of an all-women's nursing school but the Court rejected
it because the State did not establish that it was actually motivated by
women, single-sex self-defense classes do not violate the Equal Protection Clause). Cf.
Chai R. Feldblum et al., Legal Challenges to All-Female Organizations, 21 HARV. C.R.-C.L.
L. RaV. 171, 173 (1986) ("[I]nvoking the compensatory purpose doctrine is appropri-
ate in situations where acting in a 'sex-blind' or 'equal' manner would result in per-
petuating existing inequalities."). But cf. John Leo, Girls-Only Public School Is an Idea
Worth Trying, PLAIN DEALER (Cleveland), July 31, 1996, at liB, available in 1996 WL
3563703 (arguing that "[v]ictim theory requires constant reminders of oppression,
deprivation and second-class status to justify girls-only schools.... [I]f the school is to
become permanent, it logically depends on finding more and more patriarchal op-
pression to justify it").
210 VMI VT, 116 U.S. at 2276 (citations omitted).
211 Hogan, 458 U.S. at 728 ("In limited circumstances, a gender-based classification
favoring one sex can be justified if it intentionally and directly assists members of the
sex that is disproportionately burdened."); see also von Lohmann, supra note 209, at
201 ("[G]eneral societal discrimination alone will support voluntarily affirmative ac-
tion plans aimed at assisting women.").
2 See Hogan, 458 U.S. at 729 (noting that Mississippi failed to show that female
nurses were denied opportunities in either obtaining education or within the field).
215 See id. at 728 ("[A] State can evoke a compensatory purpose tojustify an other-
wise discriminatory classification only if members of the gender benefited by the clas-
sification actually suffer a disadvantage related to the classification."); see also Califano
v. Goldfarb, 430 U.S. 199, 209 (1976) (acknowledging that "redressing our society's
longstanding disparate treatment of women" is a permissive purpose (citing Craig v.
Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 198 n.6 (1976))).
214 See supra notes 90-91 and accompanying text (noting the Garrett court's premo-
nition that it is unlikely that defendant can prove the second prong because it has not
shown that the exclusion of females from the Academies are needed to fight unem-
ployment and high dropout and homicide rates, and because no evidence exists that
the Detroit system fails its boys because of the presence of girls); see also Feldblum et
al., supra note 209, at 212 (noting that in Hogan the fact that men audited the nursing
classes indicated that their exclusion was not necessary to achieve the State's goals and
thus, a sufficient relation did not exist between the means and the end).
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215the benign purpose and because the Court concluded that no af-
firmative action for women was needed in the nursing profession
since women accounted for over ninety percent of all nurses. 2' 6 The
Court also noted that the maintenance of the all-women nursing
school actually harmed women by further entrenching the notion
that nursing was a women's profession.
Unlike in Hogan, evidence suggests that compensatory purposes
motivated YWLS at least in part.28 Moreover, contrary to the nursing
profession, there is a dearth of women leaders29 and men tend to
215 See Hogan, 458 U.S. at 728 ("'[T]he mere recitation of a benign, compensatory
purpose is not an automatic shield which protects against any inquiry into the actual
purposes underlying a statutory scheme.'" (quoting Weinberger v. Wiesenfeld, 420
U.S. 636, 648 (1975))).
216 Id. at 729 ("Mississippi has made no showing that women lacked opportunities
to obtain training in the field of nursing or to attain positions of leadership in that
field when the MUW School of Nursing opened its door or that women currently are
deprived of such opportunities."). For a discussion that substantiates the need for
compensation in areas such as male-dominated professions, see Elizabeth Monk-
Turner, Sex Differentials in Unemployment Rates in Male-Dominated Occupations and Indus-
tries During Periods of Economic Downturn, in GENDER DIFFERENCES: THEIR IMPACT ON
PUBUC POLIcy 89, 91 (Mary Lou Kendrigan ed., 1991) ("There has been little change
in the proportion of women employed in male-dominated occupations since 1900.
Occupational segregation by sex is more extreme than that by race." (footnote omit-
ted)).
2 See Hogan, 458 U.S. at 729 ("Rather than compensate for discriminatory barriers
faced by women, MUW's policy of excluding males from admission to the School of
Nursing tends to perpetuate the stereotyped view of nursing as an exclusively women's
job."). The classification might further have injured nurses by keeping their wages
depressed. See id. at 729 n.15 ("To the extent the exclusion of men has that effect,
MUW's admissions policy actually penalizes the very class the State purports to bene-
fit.").
8s See supra notes 22-24 and accompanying text.
219 See Murphy, supra note 199, at 22-23. The author states:
[Iun 1994, there are on the average only three women executives for every
one-hundred top executive jobs at the largest companies; there is only one
woman lawyer for every four lawyers; there is only one woman doctor for every
five doctors; there is only one woman dentist for every eight dentists; there
are only 47 women representatives in the United States House of Representa-
tives; there are only seven women senators in the United States Senate; there
are only two women United State Supreme CourtJustices; and no woman has
ever been president or vice-president of the United States.
Id. (footnotes omitted); see also DEBORAH L. RHODE, JUSTICE AND GENDER 162-64, 162
(1989) (noting that "wide disparities have persisted in the sexes' vocational status"); cf
Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 686 n.17 (1973) (plurality opinion) ("It is true,
of course, that when viewed in the abstract, women do not constitute a small and pow-
erless minority. Nevertheless, in part because of past discrimination, women are vastly
underrepresented in this nation's decisionmaking councils.").
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dominate occupations that require math and science backgrounds.
2 2
Furthermore, studies have shown that girls suffer discrimination in
co-ed public schools.22' Although this evidence should be sufficient to
demonstrate that the sex "benefited by the classification did indeed
suffer from past discrimination," the Supreme Court has never made
entirely clear what type of evidentiary showing is necessary.222
These facts about societal disparities between men and women
See Murphy, supra note 199, at 22 (noting that most doctors and dentists are
men); see also NATIONAL CTR. FOR EDUC. STATISTICS, supra note 22, at 13 (citing a study
that revealed that in 1992, twice as many men as women received degrees in physical
sciences and math); cf. WOMEN, WORK, & SCHOOL 5 (Leslie R. Wolfe ed., 1991)
("[R]eports ... suggest that discrimination by race and sex in the job market is largely
a result of the sex and race stereotyping... in education and training programs.").
In the realm of affirmative action programs aimed at remedying racial discrimina-
tion, at least one member of the Supreme Court has said "'[s]ocietal discrimination,
without more, is too amorphous a basis for imposing a racially classified remedy.'"
Johnson v. Transportation Agency, 480 U.S. 616, 650 (1987) (O'Connor, J., concur-
ring in judgment) (quoting Wygant v. Jackson Board of Educ., 476 U.S. 267, 290
(1986) (O'Connor, J., concurring)). Remedying past discrimination by the employer
has been upheld as a compelling reason for preferential treatment. See United States
v. Paradise, 480 U.S. 149, 166 (1987) ("[G]overnment bodies ... may constitutionally
employ racial classifications essential to remedy unlawful treatment of racial or ethnic
groups subject to discrimination."). Although District Four can avail itself of the less
burdensome standard found in sex discrimination jurisprudence, the district could
probably meet the tougher race standard by demonstrating that girls have been dis-
criminated against in its co-ed schools, especially in math and science classes.
The composition of YWLS consists mostly of African-American and Hispanic girls
from East Harlem. See Sanchez, supra note 6, at A8. Girls with a history of academic
excellence but with disadvantaged backgrounds benefited from a preference in the
admission procedure. See id. This raises interesting questions about the mode of
comparison when establishing a need for compensation: Should the inquiry focus on
their neighborhood? On their ethnic group? On society at large? Recall in Garrett
that the school board argued that Detroit's boys performed worse than its girls. See
Garrett v. Board of Educ., 775 F. Supp. 1004, 1007 (E.D. Mich. 1991).
221 See, e.g., How SCHOOLS SHORTCHANGE GIRLS, supra note 200, at 68 & n.1 (citing
multiple studies that found that boys receive more attention than girls receive from
teachers from preschool through high school); Carolyn Ellis Stanton, Sex Discrimina-
tion in Public Education, 58 MiSS. LJ. 323, 337 (1988) (calling sexual harassment in sec-
ondary schools a "disturbing problem"); Mollman, supra note 176, at 170 ("Subtle or
overt, co-ed schools contain significant gender-based discrimination which serves to
limit irls' self-perception and create a sense of inferiority and second-class status.").
--- See von Lohmann, supra note 209, at 203 ("In the words of the Third Circuit:
'The Court has upheld gender preferences where no statistics were offered... struck
down gender preferences despite the presence of statistics ... and also decided cases
both ways by relying in part on statistics .... '" (quoting Contractors Ass'n of E. Pa. v.
City of Phila., 6 F.3d 990, 1010 (3d Cir. 1993))). Von Lohmann concludes that "Hogan
teaches that public institutions must produce enough evidence... to demonstrate
that the asserted compensatory purpose is not merely a cover for archaic stereotypes."
Id. at 204.
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demonstrate that a classification aimed at increasing the number of
female leaders and the number of women in male-dominated profes-
sions would be "important." The State, however, must also demon-
strate that the means YWLS uses substantially relate to that compensa-
tory objective.22 Because compensatory objectives are generally
deemed important, if a state actually motivated by a genuine compen-
satory purpose fails, it is usually because it has not established that the
means it employed were substantially related to that objective.2 4
For example, an Alabama statute that allowed alimony awards
only for women failed the second prong of the intermediate scrutiny
test in Orr v. Orr2 The Court reasoned that because individualized
hearings already occur in divorce proceedings, the State could easily
succeed in its purpose-to compensate women for economic disad-
vantage due to marriage-without making a categorical rule which
denied alimony to men.226 Thus, "the gender-based distinction is gra-
tuitous" to attainment of the State's purpose. Furthermore, the
classification might actually produce "perverse results" by advantaging
only "the financially secure wife whose husband is in need."2s Justice
Brennan, writing for the Court, also warned of the potential risk
posed by benign, compensatory classifications by noting that such
classifications "must be carefully tailored" because they "carry the in-
herent risk of reinforcing stereotypes about the 'proper place' of
women and their need for special protection."2
Similarly, in Garrett, the State failed to meet the second prong. 2
The school board argued that the Academies would serve a remedial
purpose: the Academies aimed at improving the problems facing the
city's males.2 ' The district court, in enjoining the opening of the
See Garrett, 775 F. Supp. at 1006.
See, e.g., Mississippi Univ. for Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718, 730-31 (1982)
(finding that the creation of an all-women's nursing school was not related to the
state's asserted objective of compensating women for educational discrimination).
440 U.S. 268 (1979).
26 See id. at 281-82 (explaining that individualized hearings obviate the need "to
use sex as a proxy for need").
M See id. at 282-83 ("[E]ven statutes purportedly designed to compensate for and
ameliorate the effects of past discrimination must be carefully tailored.").
22 Id. at 282.
M Id. at 283.
2o See Garrett, 775 F. Supp. at 1008.
23 See id. (explaining the school board's argument that since current co-
educational programs do not work and smaller scale all-male programs have improved
urban males' lifestyles, its solution was substantially related to its remedial goals); see
also Hsiao, supra note 14, at 102 (explaining that the school board sought to combat
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Academies, expressed doubt that the school district could show that
the means-excluding girls-substantially related to this very impor-
tant goal.12
In contrast to On- and Garrett, the Court in Califano v. Webster
found the ends and means sufficiently related when it upheld a statu-
tory scheme designed to increase Social Security retirement benefits
for women. 2  The statute allowed "women, who as such have been
unfairly hindered from earning as much as men," to exclude more
low-earning years than men when they calculated their retirement
benefits. 23 The Court concluded that the means employed were sub-
stantially related to the State's compensatory objective because the
statute "operated directly to compensate women for past economic
discrimination."3 6
The statute at issue in Michael M. v. Superior Court,2 also overcame
the seco nd prong. In a plurality opinion, the Court upheld Califor-
nia's statutory rape law that only punished male offenders, under a
compensatory rationale. The plurality stated early in the opinion that
if a statutory classification "realistically reflects the fact that the sexes
are not similarly situated in certain circumstances," the Court has
found that legislatures can "'provide for the special problems of
"school failure, dropout rates, unemployment, poverty, and violence").
232 See Garret4 775 F. Supp. at 1008 ("There is no evidence that the educational sys-
tem is failing urban males because females attend schools with males."). But see Pam-
elaJ. Smith, Comment, All-Male Black Schools and the Equal Protection Clause: A Step For-
ward Toward Education, 66 TUL. L. REV. 2003, 2006 n.8 (1992) (critiquing the district
court's constitutional analysis and arguing that the school board's extensive studies of
potential remedies for the problems facing urban men revealed that single-sex envi-
ronments would help solve these problems).
233 430 U.S. 313 (1977) (per curiam).
2 See id. at 316. In Schlesinger v. Ballard, decided before the adoption of interme-
diate scrutiny, the Court also found the statutory classification at issue, allowing
women naval officers to serve four years longer than their male counterparts,
.consistent" with Congress's goal to "provide women officers with 'fair and equitable
career advancement programs.'" 419 U.S. 498, 508 (1975) (quoting H.R. REP. No. 216,
at 5 (1968)). The extra years were necessary because women needed more time to
compile promotion-worthy records since the Navy circumscribed their ability to obtain
seagoing service experience. See id. The dissent found it "troublesome ... that a gen-
der-based difference in treatment can be justified by another, broader, gender-based
difference in treatment imposed directly and currently by the Navy itself." Id. at 511
n.1 (Brennan,J., dissenting).
233 Califano, 430 U.S. at 318.
2"6 Id. (recognizing that the differential in earnings between men and women is
partially attributable to discrimination against women in employment).
237 450 U.S. 464 (1981) (plurality opinion).
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women."' Instead of the Court's typical skepticism of a state's prof-
fered compensatory purpose, the plurality gave "great deference"1 '  to
California's asserted purpose-the prevention of teenage pregnancy.
Moreover, it anomolously required only that the classification
"sufficiently" relate to the State's goal:
We need not be medical doctors to discern that young men and young
women are not similarly situated with respect to the problems and the
risks of sexual intercourse. Only women may become pregnant, and
they suffer disproportionately the profound physical, emotional, and
psychological consequences of sexual activity. The statute at issue here
protects women from sexual intercourse at an age when those conse-
240
quences are particularly severe.
Judging from the analysis gleaned from the cases described above,
a court should find that YWLS sufficiently relates to the school dis-
trict's compensatory purposes of "advanc[ing] [the] full development
of the talent" of the district's girls,24' particularly in leadership, math
and science skills. 242 A substantial amount of research exists on the
243benefits of single-sex education for girls. Females who attend sin-
gle-sex schools more frequently pursue nontraditional courses of
study, have a better self-image, including greater confidence in their
own abilities, perform at a higher level, especially in courses tradi-
tionally considered in the "male domain," and have more modem no-
tions of sex roles.24 Girls of junior-high age tend to suffer a tremen-
dous decrease in self-esteem. 24 This can cause them to self-select out
2M Id. at 469 (quoting Weinberger v. Wiesenfeld, 420 U.S. 636, 653 (1975)).
29 Id. at 470.
240 Id. at 471-72. For criticism of the plurality's reasoning, see infra note 262 and
accompanying text.
241 See VM!V, 116 S. Ct. 2264, 2276 (1996) (affirming that sex-based classifications
may be used "to advance full development of the talent and capacities of our Nation's
people").
242 See Mollman, supra note 176, at 169 ("[A]n all-girls school designed to over-
come gender discrimination by eliminating stereotypes and preparing students for
nontraditional careers would be directly related to the statutory goal of redressing the
effects of discrimination.").
243 See, e.g., MYRA SADKER & DAVID SADKER, FAILING AT FAIRNESS: HOW AMERICA'S
SCHOOLS CHEAT GIRLS 233 & n.29 (1994) (citing numerous studies and stating that
.even as single-sex schools fight to survive, new studies offer a stunning message:
Schools without boys seem to be good for girls."); Mollman, supra note 176, at 171-72.
244 See GROSSMAN & GROSSMAN, supra note 8, at 143 (reporting the results of stud-
ies comparing girls at sectarian single-sex schools and girls in co-ed schools at both the
high school and elementary level).
See PIPHER, supra note 23, at 62-64 (attributing the decline in girls' confidence
during adolescence both to social pressure and to the structural discrimination in the
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of math, science and computer classes which can dramatically impact
their futures.24 ' A single-sex education for girls helps them combat
this low self-esteem and "[a]fter years spent as first-class educational
citizens, girls develop assertiveness, self-confidence, and leadership,
skills that are typically acquired by the higher status gender."247 Fur-
thermore, math, science and computers are often perceived in co-
educational schools as "masculine" topics.241 Commentators have
noted that single-sex education of these topics, on which YWLS fo-
cuses, can confer even greater benefits because presentation of these
topics in such a setting can "help girls overcome stereotypical views of
what is appropriate for them or what is within their abilities, enabling
them to acquire skills in a manner not available to them in a mixed-
sex group setting.2 4 9 Evidence also reveals the success that women's
colleges have in turning out women suited for leadership.2s 0 Gradu-
ates of women's colleges occupy a disproportionate number of pres-
tigious and high-paying jobs in business, politics and professions re-
quiring a scientific background.2
The Supreme Court may require not only a showing that single-
sex education confers benefits on women, but also that "a single-sex
format offers benefits particular to that program" 2 2 YWLS can meet this
standard because scholarship suggests that girls can benefit more
classroom); SADKER & SADKER, supra note 243, at 78 (reporting the results of a 1990
national survey demonstrating that girls' self-esteem fell dramatically between elemen-
tary and middle schools at an average of 31% while the average drop in self-esteem for
boys was only 21%).
246 See SADKER & SADKER, supra note 243, at 123-24 (reporting that girls' decisions
to self-select out of classes like physics and chemistry may be partially attributable to
their feelings that they do not understand the equipment as well as boys do); cf. Feld-
blum et al., supra note 209, at 181 ("The sex-role stereotypes learned by both girls and
boys in their early years, and the resulting negative interactions that occur in mixed-
sex settings later in life, mean that women are often unable to achieve their potential
in mixed-sex settings and thus are prevented from achieving equality with men.").
247 SADKER & SADKER, supra note 243, at 248.
248 See id. at 122-24 (describing experiential data showing that both girls and boys
conceive of scientists as men and that boys are more likely to dominate math, science
and computer classes).
249 Feldblum et al., supra note 209, at 177.
20 See Willinger, supra note 201, at 255-56 (stating that "extensive research" sup-
ports the conclusion that single-sex education benefits many women).
25 See id. at 256 (noting that 81% of women's college graduates continue their
education beyond the undergraduate level).
2von Lohmann, supra note 209, at 210 (distinguishing between an institution's
attempt to justify its single-sex education based on general findings about the benefits
of single-sex education for women and an institution's justification that relies on evi-
dence that women in one specific curriculum do better in a single-sex environment).
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from leadership training and math and science instruction in a single-
sex setting.25s Moreover, minorities appear to reap special benefit
from a single-sex learning environment.L 4 These showings indicate
that YWLS does not suffer from overinclusivity.25 Overinclusive classi-
fications have a greater propensity to reinforce harmful stereotypes.2
6
In sum, excluding boys is substantially and directly related to the re-
medial objective.
If a court accepts the State's compensatory objective, then it does
not matter if YWLS is unique or if its curriculum is offered elsewhere.
To reiterate: no "evenhandedness" requirement exists for this objec-
tive because the theoretical focus of "compensation" rests on the idea
that the classification levels the playing field-not that it confers a
special benefit on one group at the expense of another.f7 This objec-
tive also lends itself to an additional argument for why boys might be
denied the "special benefit" of single-sex education: all-male institu-
tions further institutionalize sexism, thereby making the status of
women in our society worse off-which undermines the State's com-
pensatory objective.2
23 See Marlaine E. Lockheed & Katherine Patterson Hall, Conceptualizing Sex as a
Status Characteristic: Applications to Leadership Training Strategies, 32 J. Soc. ISSUES 111,
120 (1976) (finding that women learn leadership skills better in single-sex rather than
mixed-sex settings); M. Elizabeth Tidball, Baccalaureate Origins of Entrants into American
Medical Schools, 56J. HIGHER EDUC. 385, 389-90 (1985) (reporting all-women colleges
sent a greater percentage of women to medical school than did coeducational col-
leges).
See Caplice, supra note 204, at 247-48 (citing studies showing that minority stu-
dents attending single-sex schools perform better on tests and graduate at a higher
rate than their peers at coeducational schools).
.3 See von Lohmann, supra note 209, at 211 (opining that a "compensatory self-
defense course" for women is not overinclusive as the Ninth Circuit applied that stan-
dard to judge state-sponsored set-asides for female contractors); see also Weinberger v.
Wiesenfeld, 420 U.S. 636, 652 n.19 (1975) (noting that "if the society's aim is to fur-
ther a socially desirable purpose... it should tailor any subsidy directly to the end de-
sired, not indirectly and unequally"); cf. Schlesinger v. Ballard, 419 U.S. 498, 507
(1975) (arguing that Reed and Frontiero showcased "overbroad generalizations that
could not be tolerated under the Constitution").
2M See von Lohmann, supra note 209, at 211. In addition to the previously men-
tioned factors, von Lohmann also argues that voluntary enrollment means that a pro-
gram is "necessarily underinclusive." Id.
257Thus, Caplice's argument that "single-sex education [should] not [be] about
putting one sex in a position to beat down or pull ahead of the other sex" rings hol-
low. by limiting single-sex education in this manner, women will not be ahead of men,
but perhaps closer to level ground with them. See Caplice, supra note 204, at 287.
See, e.g., VMIV, 116 S. Ct. 2264, 2277 n.8 (1996) ("'The pluralistic argument for
preserving all-male colleges is uncomfortably similar to the pluralistic argument for
preserving all-white colleges.... It is ... likely to be a witting or unwitting device for
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B. The Potential Dangers of Compensatory Rationales Are Minimized Here
As Justice Brennan warned in Orr v. Orr, compensatory justifica-
tions must be carefully scrutinized lest the classification reinforce in-
vidious stereotypes about the class it purports to benefit. 25 The Mi-
chael M. case bore out Brennan's fears. Critics of Michael M. argue
that California's purported purpose of pregnancy prevention "was a
patently transparent post-hoc rationalization."260 California's and
other states' real rationales for their statutory rape laws include
"cultural stereotypes about men as sexual aggressors, and women, es-
pecially young women, as passive and victimized, but never appropri-
ately sexual agents."
261
The reasoning in Michael M. illustrates how biology is used to
disguise or justify social norms that keep women in traditional gender
roles.2 ' 2 Although many commentators insist that pervasive and in-
261
herent differences distinguish, or polarize, the sexes, it must be
preserving tacit assumptions of male superiority-assumptions for which women must
eventually pay.'" (quoting JENCKS & REISMAN, supra note 177, at 297-98 (1968));
LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 16-25, at 1066 (1978)
("[S]eparate educational facilities seem[] ... likely to contribute to a myth of male
superiority in things academic .... "); Mollman, supra note 176, at 167 ("Rather than
promoting equal opportunity, all-boys schools preserve male dominance."); Truely &
Davis, supra note 5, at 735-36 (discussing a study that found that male teachers at all-
boys private schools "perpetuated sexism by teaching male students to view women as
sex objects and by socializing them to maintain power and control over women in sex-
ual interactions"); cf Feldblum et al., supra note 209, at 171 ("The restrictive member-
ship policies of all-male organizations ... have often served to keep women out of po-
sitions of power and potential growth, and to perpetuate the view of women as a weak
or inferior group.").
One YWLS student insightfully summed up the compensatory rationale: "'It's an
idea of fairness that's been striven for. In order to go for that idea of fairness you may
have to practice unfairnesses along the way.'" Henry, supra note 2, at 2D (quoting
Deshana Hamid).
29 See 440 U.S. 268, 283 (1979) (explaining that compensatory or protective objec-
tives may shelter stereotypes about women).
2 Finley, supra note 132, at 1095 (arguing that the Court has often based its deci-
sions on essentialistic views about both men and women).
261 Id.
262 See Katherine M. Franke, The Central Mistake of Sex Discrimination Law: The Disag-
gregation of Sex from Gender, 144 U- PA. L. REV. 1, 11 (1995) (arguing that Michael M. is
an example of a case where the Court relied "on the presumption that, on a funda-
mental level, males and females are not similarly situated-they are in fact different
kinds of beings").
265 See SANDRA LIPSITz BEM, THE LENSES OF GENDER: TRANSFORMING THE DEBATE
ON SEXUAL INEQUALITY 2 (1993) (explaining that "gender polarization" is society's use
of the idea that men and women are different to forge connections between sex and
every aspect of human behavior, including "ways of expressing emotion and experi-
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recognized that "[t]he variability among females and among
males ... far outweighs the average difference between males and
females."6 It is more sound to focus on the commonalities rather
than the supposed differences between the sexes. By focusing on
perceived differences between the sexes, it is easy to forget that soci-
ety and socialization have created or magnified most of these so-called
sex differences.'6 Thus, the VMI Court took the right approach when
it refused to deny opportunities to women based on generalizations
about their desires and abilities.68
District Four does not rely on biology to justify YWLS. The stu-
dents at the school are not being compensated for their biology, but
for societal discrimination. In analyzing compensatory classifications,
courts must also question "whether a challenged program actually
compensates women for discrimination, or is instead an exercise of
'romantic paternalism.'"2 67 In the case of YWLS, the school's main
goal is to overcome traditional notions about the proper roles of268
women. Although it is possible that some onlookers will view the
school as a manifestation of girls' inferiority in subjects like science
and math, it seems more likely that the school will produce capable
young women who are confident in their abilities and whose lives will
be a testament to the invalidity of negative gender role stereotypes.
The possible "double-edged" quality of benign classifications 2 c
encing sexual desire"); see also, e.g., Caplice, supra note 204, at 230 ("[B]oth.sexes, be-
cause they develop physiologically, intellectually, and emotionally at different tempos,
can benefit equally from single-sex instruction.").
264Avery, supra note 1, at 303 (emphasis omitted) (quoting the testimony of Pro-
fessor Carol NagyJacklin, one of the government's expert witness in the second VW!
trial).
263 See Franke, supra note 262, at 40 (arguing that "gender norms, not precultural
biological facts, make up the difference that sexual difference makes").
But cf. Caplice, supra note 204, at 258 (arguing that "biological differences be-
tween the sexes transcend mere physical differences and extend to temperamental
disposition and cognitive functioning").
von Lohmann, supra note 209, at 212 (quoting Frontiero v. Richardson, 411
U.S. 677, 684 (1973) (plurality opinion), and noting that the effect of such paternal-
ism puts women "'not on a pedestal, but in a cage'"))., c,3Cf. id. (noting that "voluntary self-defense courses are inherently unlikely to
reinforce traditional stereotypes"); Mollman, supra note 176, at 169 ("Rather than be-
ing based upon or perpetuating stereotypical views of women, these programs would
prepare girls for nontraditional careers and lives.").
See Udell, supra note 95, at 527 (discussing benign classifications as "double-
edged... resting on stereotypes that ultimately precluded women from equal partici-
pation in society"); see also RHODE, supra note 219, at 298 ("Separatist education, like
other separatist associations, offers the vices and virtues of a ghetto: it provides sup-
port, solidarity, and self-esteem for subordinate groups, but often at the price of per-
19971 1031
1032 UNIVERSITY OFPENNSYLVANIA LAWREVIEW [Vol 145:987
be forgotten, but this recognition should not preclude carefully tai-
lored programs like YWLS from succeeding-it just means that courts
must engage in careful scrutiny to guard against this defect. Careful
scrutiny of YWLS suggests that it functions to overthrow stereotypes
rather than perpetuate them and that it seeks "to create a society in
which [its] compensatory function is no longer required."
2 70
CONCLUSION
VMT implies that YWLS would be found constitutional. The fore-
going analysis suggests that in the absence of a parallel school system,
a single-sex school will only pass equal protection scrutiny if it is tai-
lored to fit a compensatory purpose. Allowing for compensatory ra-
tionales, however, does not rely on any notion of biological differ-
ence, but rather, recognizes that society has treated and continues to
treat women and men differently and that, sometimes, the govern-
ment can try to ameliorate this disparate treatment. While YWLS fits
this rationale, the more dominant trend of all-male schools probably
would not withstand scrutiny, because men, unlike women, have not
suffered historically from educational discrimination.
Whether the "separate but equal" doctrine is appropriate in the
area of sex discrimination remains an open question. It does appear
that, if the Court adopts the doctrine in this area, other aspects of the
Court's reasoning would constrain the doctrine's use.
This conclusion opens the door a crack to single-sex education.
Most likely, only girls schools motivated by a remedial purpose and
tailored to achieve that purpose will be able to slip through. Keeping
in mind that the objective of these permissible classifications is to im-
prove the status of women, courts must remain vigilant. They must
not accept a benign classification at first glance, but must perform a
searching analysis to determine whether the classification relies on
fixed ideas about gender roles or uses essentialist ideas to cloak ineq-
uitable societal practices or assumptions.
petuating attitudes that perpetuate subordination.").
270 RHODE, supra note 219, at 299 (arguing that the positive aspects of single-sex
environments like "role models, leadership opportunities, and positive teaching envi-
ronments ... should become more dominant in coeducational settings as well").
271 See von Lohmann, supra note 209, at 213 (noting that men "are generally ineligi-
ble for special treatment under a remedial rationale"); see also Mollman, supra note
176, at 172-73 ("All-male public education inevitably perpetuates gender inequities,
and thus violates the constitutional guarantees of equal opportunity embodied in the
Fourteenth Amendment.").
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The YWLS should pass such close scrutiny because rather than
serving to perpetuate inequality, it aims to ensure girls "equal oppor-
tunity to aspire, achieve, participate in and contribute to society based
on their individual talents and capacities.
"
,7
7VM VI, 116S. Ct. 2264, 2275 (1996).
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